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In this dissertation, I explore how top executives’ and directors’ embeddedness in 
corporate elite networks within and between organizations’ boards of directors influence 
organizational strategy and policy. In the first study, I conduct a comprehensive review of the 
governance literature using both a traditional narrative approach as well as a bibliometric main 
path analysis, which traces the development and diffusion of scholarly knowledge on corporate 
elite networks. In the second study, drawing from network theory and behavioral governance 
research, I introduce a methodology that allows researchers to model intraboard networks by 
measuring the strength of ties among members of boards of directors based on objective 
formative indicators of the constructs of social similarity, social status, social exchange, and 
social history. Next, I use this technique to explore the antecedents and consequences of 
intraorganizational network characteristics of boards. Finally, in the third study, I examine the 
joint influence of interlocking directorates and intraorganizational networks of boards of 
directors on interorganizational imitation of corporate strategic activity. Results show that 
directors’ centrality within a focal organization’s board and those of its alters are important 
predictors of interorganizational imitation of corporate strategic activity. I contribute to the 
strategic management and organization theory literatures by advancing our understanding of the 
relationship of corporate elite networks with organizational strategy and policy, and by 
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As a species, humans are intrinsically motivated to form relationships and bond with 
others. In the context of work organizations, relationships are believed to present individuals 
with opportunities for achievement, promotion, and advancement, with those who are embedded 
in, hold prominent positions within, and are motivated to leverage their networks reaping the 
greatest benefits. Network relationships are valued because they allow individuals to develop and 
maintain a sense of social identity. Even at the highest level of organizations, networks help 
access, acquire, move, distribute, and put into use existing resources, all the while helping 
generate new resources for production or consumption. 
In this three-chapter dissertation, I build on this axiom to explore how executives’ and 
directors’ embeddeness in inter- and intraorganizational network relationships (forged within and 
between boards of directors) influence organizational strategy and policy decisions. In Chapter I, 
I take stock of the extant literature on corporate elite networks by conducting both a traditional 
narrative review and a bibliometric main path analysis. In the first part of Chapter I, I develop a 
framework that helps organize extant research that has utilized network theoretic concepts and 
methods in the context of corporate governance, specifically corporate elite networks. In so 
doing, I help move the field toward developing a more coherent understanding of the relationship 
between corporate elite networks and organizational strategy. In the second part of Chapter I, I 
conduct a main path analysis on bibliographic citation data to uncover the key publications and 
citation links that have played a bridging role in the diffusion of scholarly knowledge on 
corporate elite networks since the early 1980s. Moreover, this systematic review allows me to 
identify key research themes in research on corporate elites and the main turning points in the 
management field’s emphasis on corporate elite networks. The analysis suggests that there has 
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been a gradual movement from outwardly focused networks of boards of directors, which was 
traditionally concentrated on interlocking directorates, to inwardly focused board networks (i.e., 
within-board relationships), with most recent research jointly exploring the influence of inwardly 
and outwardly focused network ties on organizational strategy and policy. Nevertheless, Chapter 
I further documents that the antecedents and consequences of directors’ embeddedness within 
intraorganizational networks of boards of directors remains underdeveloped in comparison to 
research on interorganizational relationships in corporate governance. One of the most important 
implications of the disproportionate attention allocated to external networks of boards of 
directors is an incomplete understanding of the relationship between intraorganizational network 
relationships of directors and organizational agency problems. 
To address this important issue in governance research, in Chapter II, I introduce a 
methodology to infer intraorganizational social relationships of boards of directors. I build on 
prior research on tie formation in social networks, behavioral governance theory, and recent 
theoretical work in corporate governance research, to develop a composite measure of dyadic tie 
strength in boards of directors using objective formative indicators of the following latent 
constructs: social similarity, social influence, social exchange, and social history. Next, based on 
functional and sociological perspectives in corporate governance, I develop a theoretical 
framework that outlines the antecedents and consequences of structural equivalence and 
cohesion within intraorganizational networks of boards of directors. Conceptualizing the board 
as an information processing unit that help mitigate agency problems and advise on 
organizational strategy decisions, I explore the relationships among the organizational 
environment, organizational characteristics, and intraorganizational network characteristics that 
are associated with ‘social contagion’ and ‘diffusion of information’, and finally, organizational 
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outcomes that have been linked to agency problems. Specifically, I test a) the relationship 
between environmental uncertainty and structural equivalence on the board, b) firm centrality 
and structural cohesion on the board, and c) the relationship of equivalence and cohesion with 
CEO compensation, firm diversification, and strategic risk-taking. The results suggest that 
structural equivalence on the board curtails agency problems via lower levels of total and 
unrelated diversification, while cohesion exacerbates agency problems by reducing the level of 
strategic risk-taking. The results also show that organizations that are central in their interlocking 
directorate networks have more cohesive intraorganizational board networks, providing some 
support for the intraclass perspective on corporate elite networks. 
To further document the utility of the inferred intraorganizational networks of boards of 
directors, in Chapter III, I explore the joint influence of directors’ embeddedness within and 
between board networks on organizational strategy. Past research on interorganizational 
imitation and diffusion has shown evidence that when confronted with competitive uncertainty, 
organizations adopt decisions of other organizations (alters) in their networks. Based on recent 
theoretical and empirical work in corporate governance research, which has begun to explore the 
circumstances under which interlocked directors’ experiences in other organizations more 
strongly influence organizational outcomes, I examine how corporate expansion decisions of 
interlocked organizations influence a focal organization’s subsequent expansion decisions, 
specifically its corporate acquisition activity. Conceptualizing directors’ preferential access to 
and control over knowledge flows within boards of directors in network terminology (i.e., 
structural embededdness), I explore how director centrality within the focal organization’s 
intraboard network and that of its alters influence the extent to which alters’ prior acquisition 
activity influences the focal organization’s subsequent acquisition activity. Furthermore, I 
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empirically test whether interoganizational imitation of corporate acquisition activity is 
contingent on the strength of ties among directors both on the focal organization’s board and on 
its alters’ boards. The results suggest that while centrality is an important predictor of the extent 
to which directors can enable interorganizational imitation of corporate acquisition activity, tie 
strength does not have an observed statistically significant effect on interorganizational imitation. 
Taken together, Chapters I, II, and III contribute to research on corporate elite networks, 
in particular, and corporate governance research, in general, by developing a more nuanced and 
coherent understanding of the antecedents, consequences, and contingencies of directors’ 
embeddedness in networks. Chapter I presents one of the few known examples of main path 
analysis conducted in the management literature. Chapter II introduces an important 
methodological approach that helps overcome one of the important limitations of corporate 
governance research—which is the lack of access to primary data on intraorganizational board 
network relationships—by inferring social relationships among directors based on objective 
formative indicators. Chapter III provides a test of the notion that directors’ access to and control 
over knowledge-based flows within and between boards of directors is an important determinant 
of the extent to which interorganizational mimicry of corporate strategic activity occurs. 
Throughout the dissertation, I discuss the implications of my findings for corporate 
governance theory as well as offer new directions for researchers and practitioners, who are 




II. Chapter I: The Application of Network Theoretic Concepts and Analytic Methods in 




Understanding the social structure of directors’ networks has long been of interest to 
scholars in management theory. A set of network attributes and social processes has been shown 
to influence organizational actions. The purpose of this paper is to review research that has 
utilized network theoretic concepts and methods in the context of executives and board of 
directors. In doing so, I lay the groundwork for a more coherent theoretical perspective on 
corporate elite networks, while identifying important theoretical and empirical advances and 
providing new directions for future research. In a narrative review, I outline changes in the 
field’s emphasis on various issues pertaining to social relationships among members of the 
corporate elite. I supplement my narrative review with a main path analysis of the literature, a 
social network analytic technique applied to bibliographical citation data, with the intention of 
exploring the main paths of knowledge codification and knowledge diffusion at the intersection 








Network theory has become an important theoretical and empirical paradigm in 
organizational research in recent decades (Borgatti & Foster, 2003). Widespread use of network 
theoretic concepts and methods in management research has helped develop a vast literature on 
interorganizational relationships that encompasses a broad range of social, financial, and political 
ties among organizations (Galaskiewicz, 1985). At the epicenter of this literature is the economic 
conduct of business organizations embedded in social institutions (Granovetter, 1985). In a 
dynamic nexus of multilevel and multilayered relationships, individual organizations continually 
form, dissolve, and reconstitute ties with other organizations (Kenis & Knoke, 2002; Mizruchi & 
Galaskiewicz, 1993). Interorganizational relationships developed through institutional 
affiliations of members of the corporate elite (Pettigrew, 1992) are among the most prominent 
network ties that have been studied to-date (Davis & Greve, 1997; Haunschild & Beckman, 
1998; Mizruchi, 1996)1. This prolonged interest is not surprising given the central role of 
corporate directors and executives in shaping organizational policy and strategy (Pettigrew, 
1992). 
Extant research on corporate executives and directors has provided important insights 
into our understanding of functions of institutional agents in corporate governance (Johnson, 
Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). While director networks have been of interest to research in sociology 
(Mizruchi, 1996) and in organizational theory (Haunschild, 1993; Davis, 1996) throughout the 
1990s, it is with the rise of the concept of board capital — specifically social capital — in the 
                                                 
1 The term corporate elite (or managerial elite) is used as an umbrella term that encompasses 
executives and directors in a social network. This use of this term also helps maintain 
consistency with prior research. By using this term, I do not mean to glorify or otherwise praise 
these social actors — an issue that has been discussed in strategic leadership research (see 
Hambrick, 2007). 
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early 2000s (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) that more mainstream corporate governance research 
began to emphasize directors’ relationships. Meanwhile, an independent stream of research 
grounded in behavioral governance theory has begun to explore the socio-psychological 
mechanisms that operate within the corporate elite’s internal and external networks (Westphal & 
Zajac, 2013). From a theoretical standpoint, research in both of these domains remains 
fragmented and disconnected, as social network theory concepts have continued to be used in a 
piece-meal fashion across these domains, with scholars mostly focusing on the instrumental 
aspects of corporate actors’ social capital. Moreover, the board capital and behavioral 
governance theory literatures have grown along separate lines, which constitutes an important 
problem in governance research. Governance research explores a complex organizational 
phenomenon — stakeholders’ insurance of return on their investments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) 
— and theoretical silos that rarely engage in cross fertilization make it difficult to make accurate 
inferences about the effectiveness of governance mechanisms. Motivated by this important 
contradiction, the purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of research on 
corporate elite networks, and in doing so, lay the groundwork for a more coherent theoretical 
perspective on this topic and provide new directions for future research. 
In a narrative review of the literature, I first explore how the field’s emphasis on various 
issues pertaining to social relationships within corporate elite networks has developed over time. 
Next, I conduct a main path analysis to identify patterns of knowledge transfer among 
researchers that have utilized network theoretic concepts and methodologies in the context of 
corporate elite relationships. Main path analysis is the application of social network analytic 
methods to bibliographical citation data with the purpose of visualizing the key paths and 
patterns of knowledge codification and diffusion in a given research field (Liu & Lu, 2012). I use 
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main path analysis to retrospectively construct the paths that detail the evolution of the network 
theory and corporate elite literatures. 
In the first part of the paper, I outline the methodology that I use in my narrative review 
for constructing the sample of studies that focus on network theory in the context of corporate 
elites. In this section, I review the types of network ties and processes that have been explored 
to-date and the network theory concepts that have been most frequently examined, while 
discussing the major implications of this line of research for our understanding of corporate 
elites. I begin the second part of the paper with a discussion of the main path analytic technique 
and briefly explain how it has been used in scholarly research to-date. I conclude with a 
discussion of the contributions to the management field derived from using a sociometry-based 
methodological approach to analyzing bibliographical citation data. 
C. A Narrative Review of the Literature on Corporate Elite Networks 
The purpose of this review is to assess the use of network theoretic concepts in the 
context of corporate elite networks. To accomplish this, I focus on exemplary empirical work 
that has been published in the six most prestigious journals in the field of management: Academy 
of Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management, Journal of 
Management Studies, Organization Science, and Strategic Management Journal since 1992. I 
selected Pettigrew’s (1992) review article as my starting point, given the importance of this 
article in setting up an agenda for the study of corporate elites in management research. It is 
evident that research on corporate elite networks began to flourish in the early 1990s. While my 
focus is on empirical research published in this domain, where applicable, I also include articles 
that have been published elsewhere (e.g., Academy of Management Review) based on my 
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knowledge of the field to better capture the significance of research on social networks in the 
context of corporate elites. 
First, I conducted a search on EBSCO using the following keyword combination: 
[interlock*, “social capital”, network*, connect*, “ties”, affili*] in the abstract field, and [“board 
of directors”, CEO, “chief executive”] anywhere in the text of an article. This resulted in 298 
studies. Second, I conducted a search using the following keyword combination: [director*, 
“board of directors”, “CEO”] with [social capital] in article titles. This search retrieved 6 
additional articles. Finally, I used the following keyword combination: [“corporate elite”, “power 
elite”, “business elite”, “organizational elite”] in the abstract/title of an article, finding a total of 
17 articles. 
I carefully examined the abstracts of these articles and excluded studies that were 
irrelevant to my research question— how has the management field’s emphasis on social 
relationships within corporate elite networks developed over time? After deleting duplicate 
results, book reviews, and other unrelated search results, my final sample of empirical studies 
that reflect the application of network theoretic concepts in the context of corporate elites 
consisted of 137 articles that have been published in one of the top-six management journals in 
the period between 1992 and 2016. The search parameters used in this paper are provided in 
Appendix A. 
Content of Relationships in Corporate Elite Networks 
The literature on corporate elites is impressive in volume, such that multiple research 
streams have contributed to governance scholars’ understanding of theoretically and practically 
interesting relational phenomena observed within and between organizations (Pettigrew, 1992). 
This diversity is also reflected in the types of network ties that have been examined in prior 
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research utilizing network theoretic concepts. At the level of interpersonal relationships, prior 
network studies have typically treated expressive and instrumental ties as separate forms of 
social relationships (Fombrun, 1982; Ibarra, 1993; Umphress, Labianca, Brass, Kass, & 
Scholten, 2003). Instrumental ties tend to be developed on the basis of resource exchanges, as in 
the case of advice relationships (Ibarra, 1993); whereas expressive ties are developed based on 
some form of interpersonal affect, as in the case of friendship ties (Krackhardt, 1992). The same 
categorization can be applied to network studies in corporate elite research that focuses on 
relationships of members of boards of directors and corporate executives. Some researchers have 
focused on interpersonal social relationships among directors, executives, and their personal 
contacts in the form of friendship ties (e.g., Batjargal & Liu, 2004; Bell & Zaheer, 2007; Luo & 
Chi-Nien, 2005; McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008; McDonald & Westphal, 2003, 2010; 
2011; Park & Westphal, 2013; Shani & Westphal, 2016; Westphal & Bednar, 2005; Westphal, 
Boivie, & Chng, 2006; Westphal & Shani, 2016; Westphal & Stern, 2006). Other researchers 
have paid attention to instrumental, primarily task-oriented relationships, such as joint 
membership on boards of directors with other members of the board (e.g., Haunschild & 
Beckman, 1998; Kang, 2008; Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 2010), or directors and executives’ 
other business-related and/or political ties (e.g., Acquaah, 2012; Chizema, Liu, Lu, & Gao, 2015; 
Gargiulo, 1993; Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella Jr., 2008; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001; 
Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 2008; Li & Liang, 2015; Siegel, 2007; Wang & Qian, 2011; Zhu & Chung, 
2014). 
Among instrumental ties, interlocking directorates, which occur among two organizations 
when a director sits on both boards (Mizruchi, 1996), are arguably the most commonly examined 
relationships in management research. Intercorporate ties established through director 
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appointments entail not only director-to-director, but also organization-to-organization 
relationships. As such, board interlocks have been examined as both an interorganizational and 
an intraclass phenomenon (Ornstein, 1984; Palmer, 1983; Richardson, 1987). As Palmer (1983) 
explains, the intraclass perspective diverges from the interorganizational approach by 
conceptualizing directors as a distinctive social class who enact their economic interests via 
relationships that constitute a nexus of organizations. 
A range of empirical relationships involving board interlocks and other major corporate 
governance mechanisms, practices, and policies have been examined, including but not limited 
to: the market for corporate control and takeovers (Davis & Stout, 1992), firms changing 
affiliations with stock exchanges (Rao, Davis, & Ward, 2000), executive compensation 
(Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001), executive (Williamson & Cable, 2003) and director 
appointments (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, & 
Dalton, 2011), investor reactions to new CEO appointments (Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 
2011), structural changes such as the establishment of investor relations departments at firms 
(Rao & Sivakumar, 1999), the adoption of governance reforms (Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 
2010b), and the establishment of compensation committees responsible for determining CEO 
compensation (Markóczy, Li Sun, Peng, Shi, & Ren, 2013). With respect to organizational 
strategy and outcomes, research to-date has focused on the relationship between board interlocks 
and acquisitions (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Haunschild, 1993, 1994; Haunschild & 
Beckman, 1998; Palmer & Barber, 2001; Westphal et al., 2001), joint ventures (Gulati & 
Westphal, 1999), international expansion (Connelly, Johnson, Tihanyi, & Ellstrand, 2011; 
Tuschke, Sanders, & Hernandez, 2014), resource allocations to organizational functions (i.e., 
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business strategy) (Westphal et al., 2001), change in resource allocation patterns (Haynes & 
Hillman, 2010), and finally, organizational performance (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009).  
 One of the main themes in this literature is that interlocking directorates are conduits for 
knowledge transfer among organizations (Howard, Withers, & Tihanyi, 2016) and an 
organization’s embeddedness in these networks increases the likelihood that it will model itself 
after tied-to organizations in its network (Haunschild, 1993). Novel strategies are often deemed 
risky. The adoption of novel practices and strategies by tied-to organizations in the network 
sends the focal organization a legitimizing signal under uncertainty (Haunschild & Beckman, 
1998). Research also suggests that organizations become increasingly more receptive to 
experience-based knowledge that directors with other board memberships bring to the focal firm 
when the director or tied-to organization (i.e., interlocked organization) is of higher status 
(Shropshire, 2010). This contention is corroborated by findings that organizations with interlock 
ties to other organizations, closer to the core of the interlocking directorate network, are more 
likely to adopt diffusing strategies (Connelly et al., 2011). 
In contrast, behavioral governance research that focuses on close interpersonal 
relationships and mechanisms in the context of corporate elite networks has explored the 
influence of expressive ties on a variety of subjects, including positive interpersonal outcomes 
such as CEOs’ advice seeking (McDonald & Westphal, 2003) and their provision of social 
support to fellow CEOs (McDonald & Westphal, 2011), as well as venture capitalists’ 
investments in entrepreneurial firms (Batjargal & Liu, 2004), biases in group decision-making, 
such as ‘pluralistic ignorance’ (Westphal & Bednar, 2005), business group performance (Luo & 
Chi-Nien, 2005), and other interpersonal processes associated with directors/executives, 
including the use of social influence tactics (Westphal & Stern, 2006), and social identification 
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with the corporate elite (McDonald & Westphal, 2010; McDonald & Westphal, 2011; Shani & 
Westphal, 2016). Recent research in this domain has also began to explore more negative forms 
of interpersonal contact such as social distancing from the corporate elite (Shani & Westphal, 
2016; Westphal & Khanna, 2003), and discrimination of corporate elite members and journalists 
(Park & Westphal, 2013). 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of behavioral governance research is that it 
largely departs from the classic governance theory’s conception of relationships among corporate 
elite members, which suggests that strong, intrafirm, interpersonal ties among executives and 
directors create opportunities for collusion, induce conflicts of interest, and thus could be 
detrimental to firms. For instance, Daily and Dalton (1994) show that firms that appoint a greater 
number of affiliated directors to their boards suffer from agency problems, evidenced by an 
increased likelihood of these firms filing for bankruptcy. Similarly, firms that appoint a greater 
number of affiliated directors are more likely to adopt controversial governance practices, such 
as classified board provisions (Sundaramurthy, Rechner, & Wang, 1996), and thus become 
targets of shareholder discontent in the form of withholding votes during director selection 
(Hillman et al., 2011). Drawing from the social psychology literature, behavioral governance 
research challenges this contention, suggesting that interpersonal ties, or directors’ social capital, 
could be beneficial to firm conduct. 
Prior research has provided evidence of the positive effect of social capital, in the form of 
external advice networks of executives, on acquisition of competitive capabilities (McEvily & 
Marcus, 2005). Similarly, strong intrafirm ties of top managers have been shown to have a 
positive relationship with firm performance (Collins & Clark, 2003). Furthermore, Gulati and 
Westphal (1999) have shown that cooperative ties (e.g., advice seeking) among CEOs and 
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interlocking board members enhance the likelihood of tie formation among firms in the form of 
joint ventures between the focal and interlocked firms. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
idea that strong interpersonal ties have a positive influence on firm effectiveness has not been 
uniformly supported in behavioral governance research. On the one hand, demographic 
homogeneity among directors on a focal board reduces the likelihood that group polarization, a 
decision-making bias that can result in erroneous strategic choices, will occur (Zhu, 2013). 
Similarly, dense friendship ties among directors may counter pluralistic ignorance, a decision-
making bias that can also result in erroneous strategic choices and poor firm performance 
(Westphal & Bednar, 2005). On the other hand, McDonald and Westphal (2003) have shown that 
executives seek advice from their strongly connected alters when confronted with poor 
performance, which reduces the likelihood of implementing effective strategic changes and 
enhancing firm performance. 
The mixed results presented above may, to some extent, be attributable to methodological 
differences with respect to operationalizations of social capital in the context of boards of 
directors and strategic leadership of firms, as both survey-based and archival measures of 
demographic indicators have been used in the construction of network ties. Internal social capital 
or interpersonal ties among members of a focal board have typically been captured by using 
organizational tenure such as average tenure on the board (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009), co-
working experience (Tian et al., 2011), and overlap in tenure among directors on a focal board 
(Sauerwald, Zhiang, & Peng, 2016) (see Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013 for a comprehensive 
review of operationalizations of internal and external social capital). Beyond these 
methodological differences, however, exploring contingencies surrounding the relationship 
between intraorganizational ties of corporate elite members with organizational level outcomes 
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remains a fruitful research area. For instance, does strong governance design mitigate the 
presumed negative effects of high internal social capital, while exacerbating the proposed 
positive effects? Furthermore, while the relationships that imply positive affect (e.g., friendship) 
have been studied to a certain degree, we know relatively little of the antecedents and 
consequences of negative interpersonal relationships among executives and directors (Westphal 
& Zajac, 2013) and how these relationships coexist in a network with positive relationships. The 
field’s understanding of the role of power, dependency, and affect-based interpersonal 
relationships at the apex of organizations can be significantly enhanced by simultaneously 
focusing on the positive and negative relationships in corporate elite networks. 
Social Processes in Corporate Elite Networks 
Research on corporate elite networks is highly eclectic in terms of its focus on the social 
processes underlying network dynamics. While majority of this research has focused on the 
effects of tie presence (e.g., maintenance of existing relationships) on important board and 
organizational level phenomena, there has been a growing emphasis on outlining other network 
processes such as formation and dissolution of ties and the socio-psychological mechanisms that 
create change in networks (see Westphal & Zajac, 2013 for a review). Research on board 
interlocks, with its emphasis on board appointments, constitutes the key research stream that 
concentrates on network tie formation and dissolution. Zajac and Westphal (1996) have shown 
that board appointments are a function of power contests among directors, such that boards with 
strong governance practices tend to appoint directors that are associated with other strong boards, 
while boards with weak governance tend to appoint directors that are associated with weak 
boards. The authors suggest that this mechanism of homophilic reproduction (i.e., dense local 
clusters of ties among actors with similar attributes— see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 
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[2001] for a review of the homophily literature) has contributed to a fragmented interlock 
network over time wherein powerful boards have developed few interlocking directorate 
relationships to boards with powerful CEOs and vice versa. These results are also consistent with 
the literature on interpersonal influence and board appointments. 
As reviewed above, the use of interpersonal influence tactics, such as ingratiation and 
opinion conformity, is positively related to top management team members gaining board seats 
at firms to which their CEO is directly or indirectly connected (Westphal & Stern, 2006). 
Hillman, Cannella, and Harris (2002) have also documented the importance of demographic 
characteristics to tie formation. Specifically, the authors found that, while minority and majority 
directors do not differ in the number of board seats they hold, minority directors tend to advance 
more quickly from their second to third board appointments in comparison to majority directors. 
The authors discuss that the effect may be attributed to minority directors’ motivation to solidify 
their position in the intercorporate network by gaining more central positions. In the context of 
entrepreneurial CEOs, Vissa (2011) found that (entrepreneurial) CEOs tend to form ties with 
new contacts based on dyadic social similarity and task complementarity. The results also show 
that social similarity is less predictive of tie formation at lower levels of task complementarity, 
demonstrating that expressive ties may be less important as a selection criterion when 
instrumental ties are weak. These findings are also consistent with research evidence concerning 
politically connected boards, such that both breadth and depth of human and social capital of 
politically connected directors increase their likelihood of being appointed to other boards 
(Lester et al. 2008). Finally, moving beyond corporate interlocks, Westphal, Boivie, and Chng 
(2006) found that dissolved friendship ties among CEOs are more likely to be reconstituted when 
the tied-to firm is a financial institution, or involved in a resource exchange relationship with the 
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focal firm, or the focal firm is challenged by high levels of competitive uncertainty. Westphal 
and colleagues’ study remains one of the few studies that theorize about how instrumental and 
interpersonal ties collectively determine organizational outcomes — an area of governance 
research that is in need of significant development in the future. 
I present Table 1 as a general framework for organizing research in corporate elite 
networks and as a guide to help identify areas that need further development. The rows represent 
the form of relationships that can be examined. Expressive network ties could develop based on 
positive and negative interpersonal affect. External instrumental ties at the director level are 
largely composed of interlocking directorates, and internal instrumental ties involve task- or 
hierarchy-based relationships within boards of directors (e.g., interlocking board committee ties). 
The columns show four sequential processes in network dynamics: tie formation, presence (or 
maintenance), dissolution, and reconstitution. Each cell demonstrates a representative research 
topic that has already been or can be studied using a network theoretical lens in the context of 
corporate elite networks. It should be noted that the table is presented for illustrative purposes 
and is not meant to represent a comprehensive list of concepts and relationships that can be 
studied, yet it constitutes an important step toward developing a more organized research 
paradigm in this area. 
In the following section, I review the network concepts that have been explored in 
corporate governance research. It will become clear that prior research has been mainly focused 





Network Concepts used in Research on Corporate Elite Networks 
The concept of board capital has received important attention in management research in 
recent years. Board capital encompasses both human and social capital of directors (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). Human capital broadly refers to directors’ expertise and skills, whereas social 
capital relates to directors’ resources embedded in social relationships (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). Following social capital theory (Adler & Kwon, 2002), the literature on board capital 
suggests that directors who hold favorable positions in intercorporate networks are better 
positioned to access important network resources. As a testament to this contention, financial 
institutions such as banks, due to their criticality to firms’ capital structures, were once among 
the most interlocked firms (Gerlach, 1992; Mariolis & Jones, 1982). As firm’s dependence on 
banks for capital has reduced, banks’ centrality in networks has also decreased significantly 
(Davis & Mizruchi, 1999), suggesting that directors from financial institutions are no longer 
uniformly regarded as resource-rich directors. 
Researchers’ understanding of corporate governance actors’ ‘importance’, ‘prominence’, 
or ‘connectivity’ is analogous to network centrality (Freeman, 1978) in many ways; however, the 
measurement of centrality has typically been constrained to degree centrality, which is the total 
number of interlocking directorate ties of boards, the average of directors with multiple board 
memberships, etc. The measurement approach to centrality has not been consistent in the sense 
that some researchers do not account for duplicate ties (e.g., two focal members serving on the 
same board) and account only for insiders’ ties (e.g., Haunschild, 1993), while others have 
included all directors on the board (Westphal et al., 2001). Palmer and Barber (2001) 
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distinguished between received and sent interlocks,2 denoting in-degree (total number of ties 
received) and out-degree (total number of ties sent) centrality in network terminology. The 
authors found evidence that ties sent increases a firm’s propensity to pursue acquisitions; 
whereas ties received reduces this tendency. 
In one of the more elaborate treatments of network centrality, Geletkanycz, Boyd, and 
Finkelstein (2001) measured centrality in terms of degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality. 
In Freeman’s (1978) terms degree, betweenness, and closeness centrality refer to a) an actor’s 
total number of connections, b) the number of times the actor is positioned on the shortest paths 
that connect other actors to each other, and c) the actor’s distance to all other actors in the 
network, respectively. The results of the study showed that CEOs’ external networks are 
valuable resources for firms, thus CEOs with greater centrality in their networks are more 
generously compensated. The positive effect of centrality on compensation is stronger when the 
firm is diversified, that is, it is relatively more complex to manage. Eigenvector centrality has 
been used in the context of organizational adoption of network partners’ strategies. A greater 
eigenvector centrality score distinguishes firms that are closer to the core of the network from 
peripheral firms (Connelly et al., 2011). Given the heterogeneity in definitions and 
operationalizations of centrality and types of relationships (e.g., direct, indirect, directional, 
reciprocal, non-directional, etc.) developing a typology of board interlocks remains a task to be 
addressed in future governance research. 
                                                 
2 In Palmer and Barber’s (2001) terminology, a sent interlock is a network relationship that is 
constructed when the focal organization’s executive serves as an outsider on another 
organization’s board. In contrast, a received interlock refers to the appointment of executives of 
other organizations on a focal organization’s board. 
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While the influence of director’s prominence in interorganizational networks on 
organizational strategy and performance is important in and of itself, it is also important to 
understand who occupies prominent positions in corporate elite networks. In a study of board 
interlocks, Sullivan, Haunschild, and Page (2007) showed that firms’ interlocking networks 
change dramatically when they engage in unethical practices. The most significant of these 
changes is the decline in the prominence of network partners, as measured by Bonacich 
eigenvector centrality, and in network cohesion, as indicated by an indirect structural constraint 
measure. Organizations that experience network change following engagement in unethical 
practices are left with ties to “less prestigious actors”, access to “less reliable information”, “less 
trust in the network”, and “weaker norms enforcement” (Sullivan et al., 2007: 67). Much work 
remains to be done in this area. 
Another important concept that has been examined in prior research is network cohesion. 
Cohesion is generally viewed as a characteristic of relationships (rather than actors) and may 
refer to strength of ties (see Granovetter, [1973] for a discussion of strong vs. weak ties) or 
structural characteristics of networks such as connectivity or density. With respect to tie strength, 
Rao et al. (2000) showed that strong interlock ties to adopters (or non-adopters) have an 
influence on the social mobility of organizations (i.e., leaving one stock exchange to join 
another). In a study of the consequences of top management teams and knowledge workers in 
organizations, Smith, Collins, and Clark (2005) demonstrated that both network size and strength 
of ties among top management team members and their intrafirm contacts are positively related 
to firms’ knowledge creation capabilities. The strength of ties among top managers; however, 
was not related to firm performance (Collins & Clark, 2003).  
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Network cohesion can also influence the behavior of firms as evidenced by the corporate 
philanthropic contributions of interlocked firms. Tilcsik and Marquis (2013) showed that 
corporate spending on philanthropy is positively affected by the occurrence of natural events in 
local communities and that this effect is positively moderated by cohesion of intercorporate ties, 
which signals enhanced pressure on firms toward conformity with institutional norms and 
societal expectations. Research that focuses on business groups has demonstrated that network 
density influences firms’ competitive behaviors. For instance, Ayyagari, Dau, and Spencer 
(2015) found that in Indian business groups, despite a positive effect of density on corporate 
expansion, organizations that are involved in dense (i.e., more cohesive) interlocking directorates 
are less likely to announce corporate expansion plans as a response to multinational enterprises’ 
foreign direct investment announcements that target their industries. 
Interestingly, my review revealed that network theory concepts frequently appear in 
research on entrepreneurial executives. For instance, Stam and Elfring (2008) explored the 
positive effect of network centrality (closeness centrality) and bridging ties on organizations’ 
entrepreneurial orientation. Vissa and Chacar (2009) showed that entrepreneurial teams’ 
command of structural holes (measured as network constraint) is positively related to venture 
performance. Fang, Chi, Chen, and Baron (2015) investigated the influence of entrepreneurs’ 
political skills on the formation of their personal networks. The findings of the study suggest that 
politically skilled entrepreneurial executives tend to have more extensive networks that have a 
stable core and a dynamic extended component. Furthermore, these entrepreneurs are more 
capable of facilitating prominent social ties and strong network connections in their personal 
networks, subsequently improving the performance of their ventures. Despite the common 
interest in strategic leadership and networks, however, entrepreneurship and governance research 
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have had little interaction to-date, an area that is open to significant development moving 
forward. 
I report the results of a more systematic review of this literature in the following section. 
Specifically, I conduct a network analysis of bibliographic citation data of the corporate elite 
networks literature in order to supplement my narrative review, which focused on relationships 
between concepts, ideas, and theories. The main path analytic approach allows me to focus on 
relationships among scholarly publications. As has been noted in prior research, a main path 
analysis helps document “thematic or methodological transitions” in the gradual progression of a 
scientific inquiry in a field of interest (Lucio-Arias & Leydesdorff, 2008: 23). I use this 
technique to outline the main paths through which knowledge on corporate elite networks has 
developed and identify the citation links that play bridging roles in the diffusion of scholarly 
knowledge. The results of this analysis will identify key publications in the area of corporate 
elite networks. 
D. A Main Path Analytic Review of the Corporate Elite Networks Literature 
The main path analytic approach allows researchers to identify the paths through which 
knowledge has diffused in a field, especially when the field is characterized by a large body of 
research (Hummon & Doreian, 1989; Liu & Lu, 2012). Main path analysis concentrates on 
networks of publications, where publications are nodes and arcs (unidirectional ties) are citation 
links between publications. Despite its popularity in sociometry, the technique has not been 
utilized in the management literature except for Lu and Liu’s (2013) study of the resource-based 
view. The authors analyzed a total of 2105 publications in the period between 1984 and 2010 and 
showed how research in the resource-based view tradition has evolved over time by identifying 
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the most influential publications, authors, and journals that have contributed to the development 
of this area. 
In the logic of main path analysis, scholarly knowledge flows from prior publications to 
subsequent ones in a historical progressive order (i.e., acyclic network) (Johnson, Ellstrand, & 
Kepes, 2006). Put a different way, the role of subsequent work in a field is to codify and build on 
knowledge developed in predecessor studies (Lucio-Arias & Leydesdorff, 2008). A source 
publication is one that precedes all other publications in a citation network, thus it does not cite 
any other publication in the network (i.e., no outgoing arcs). A sink article, on the contrary, is 
one that succeeds all other publications in a citation, thus it is not cited by any other publication 
in the network (i.e., no incoming arcs) (Nooy, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2011). In the process of 
identifying the main path of a research domain, each link (citation) is assigned a weight based on 
a traversal count, which reflects the bridging role played by a particular publication in the 
citation network connecting source and sink articles (Nooy et al., 2011). Prior research has 
introduced three primary ways of calculating traversal counts, namely search path link count 
(SPLC), search path node pair (SPNP), and node-pair projection count (NPPC) (Batagelj & 
Mrvar, 1998; Hummon & Doreian, 1989). There are computational differences among these 
approaches; however, a fourth approach, search path count (SPC), has been recommended and 
commonly utilized in prior research (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1998; Liu & Lu, 2012; Nooy, Mrvar, & 
Batagelj, 2011). Using the SPC approach, a traversal weight is calculated by counting the 
number of citation paths that cross through a particular publication and dividing that number by 
the total number of possible paths between the source and sink articles in the network.  
Following Liu and Lu’s (2012) work, below I present an example of a citation network 
with two source nodes (A, B) and seven sink nodes (D, G, H, I, K, M, O) to help explain this 
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technique. The line values denote traversal weights; for instance, the arc from B to F is 
calculated by dividing the number of paths (pBF = 5) that cross through the BF link by the total 
number of paths linking sources to sinks in the network (PBF = 12). The distribution of traversal 
weights in the figure below also indicates that the BF link is the most influential bridge linking 
sources and sinks in the citation network. 
 
The next step in the analysis is determining the main path of the network. There are three 
approaches to identifying the main path: local, global, and key-route (Liu & Lu, 2012). With the 
local approach the procedure is to select the arc with the highest traversal weight at every step of 
the main path search. In the figure below, the main path based on the local approach is depicted 






























Alternatively, as shown below in red, the main path based on the global approach is the 
path with the largest sum of all traversal weights linking source to sink. 
 
Finally, in the key-route approach the procedure begins with the selection of the arc with 
the largest traversal weight, and then from the end node of the arc, we search forward either by 
using a global or local approach, and then repeat the search, this time beginning from the start 

























































weight stems from a source node (B), the procedure cannot go backward and will overlap with 
the local path. However, in a larger citation network the local, global, or key-route paths may or 
may not overlap. Researchers (Liu & Lu, 2012) recommend that all three approaches are used 
and the results interpreted separately to uncover different paths through which knowledge may 
have diffused. In my analysis, I focus on the global main path, and address major differences 
between this approach and results obtained by using a local approach in the discussion section. 
Sample Construction and Data Analysis Strategy 
In my analysis of directors’ intra- and interorganizational networks, following prior 
research, I collected citation data using the Web of Science database. Data include 
comprehensive information on authors, publication sources, cited references, etc. The parameters 
I used in my data collection process are provided in Appendix A. I used the following Boolean 
search algorithm using samples from two different lists: a) actors (e.g., CEO, executive, top 
management team, etc.) and b) relationships (identification, interlock, social relationship, etc.). I 
constrained my literature search to the management field category as identified in the Web of 
Science database. The initial search resulted in a total of 870 articles. After a screening process, I 
eliminated 333 articles that were not associated with the topic of interest (e.g., “top 
management” and “nomological network”). The remaining 537 studies were included in the final 
analysis. It should be noted that the relatedness criterion that I used to include studies into my 
final analysis was relatively more relaxed in comparison to the one used in my narrative analysis. 
I maintained a broad evaluation criterion to construct a sufficiently large network of publications 
and explore patterns of relationships among influential papers that span different theoretical and 
phenomenological territories. To organize, analyze, and visualize the data, I used HistCite 
(Garfield, 2009), CitNetExplorer (Van Eck & Waltman, 2014), VOSviewer (Van Eck & 
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Waltman, 2010), Pajek (Batagelj & Mrvar, 1998), and NetDraw (under UCINET) software 
(Borgatti, 2002; Borgatti, Everett, Freeman, 2002). Below, I discuss the main findings of the 
main path analysis. I begin with a discussion of the global main path. 
Interpretation of Results 
As depicted in Figure 1, the global main path, calculated based on the SPC algorithm, 
shows the path with the largest sum of all traversal weights linking source to sink publications. 
The Burt (1980)  Palmer (1983) link, as evidenced by a traversal weight of .72, appears to be 
an important path in the codification of knowledge in the corporate elite networks literature. 
Burt’s (1980) influential article marked an important step in the exploration of such network 
concepts as range and multiplexity and in the conception of interlocks as mechanisms of 
interorganizational cooptation that help manage environmental constraints and irregularities. 
Palmer’s (1983) investigation of board interlocks has highlighted, in addition to the 
interorganizational cooptation approach, an alternative conception of interlocking directorates 
that views interlocks as a manifestation of intraclass cohesion. According to this view, directors, 
as a social class, form interpersonal relationships with one another to enact their economic 
objectives. The author examined whether multiplexity (i.e., multiple interlocks) and tie strength 
(i.e., directional ties vs. non-directional ties) are important determinants of broken interlock ties 
being reconstituted. Among others, one of the interesting results of the study is the rate at which 
broken ties were reconstituted. With a 15% reconstitution rate among ‘accidentally broken’ 
board ties (this rate is 8.9% among firms with only one interlocking directorate relationship), the 
results of the study do not offer strong support for the idea of interlocks being used for the 
purpose of cooptation. Following Palmer (1983), Ornstein (1984) similarly examined the 
determinants of reconstitution of broken ties (via retirement) among Canadian organizations. The 
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results of the study not only showed significantly higher reconstitution rates of broken ties 
among Canadian organizations (40%), lending equal credibility to both intraclass and 
interorganizational perspectives, but also indicated that tie characteristics (e.g., multiplexity) are 
stronger predictors of tie reconstitution than organizational characteristics (e.g., industry 
affiliation).  
While interlocks have been viewed as mechanisms of cooptation, coordination, and 
information exchange in prior research (Palmer, 1983), Haunschild’s (1993) study can be 
regarded as one of the first empirical research papers that has explored the phenomenon of 
organizational mimicry among firms that are connected through board interlocks. In a robust 
empirical analysis that teases out several competing explanations, the author’s results showed 
that boards of directors’ acquisition activities (e.g., number of acquisitions and types of 
acquisitions) are influenced by those of other firms that are in their local interlocking directorate 
network. 
It is clear from these studies that members of the corporate elite networks are believed to 
occupy their positions for a multitude of reasons (e.g., financial, social, political cohesion, inter-
organizational cooptation, information exchange, etc.). Building on this eclectic nature of 
governance research, Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand (1996) provided a comprehensive review of 
the literature on boards of directors, focusing mainly on the roles that directors play in corporate 
governance, offering the multiplicity of director roles (e.g., monitoring, service, resource 
provision) as a potential explanation for the equivocal findings in research on corporate boards 
and organizational effectiveness. In addition, the authors highlight the key contributions that a 
social network analysis approach could offer to governance researchers:  
“Many social network algorithms may be used to model specific, individual relationships 
between not only the CEO and outside directors, but also between the directors 
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themselves. From these models, coalitions and structurally defined roles may be 
identified, and individual measures of power, as well as network measures relevant to the 
board as a whole, may be calculated” (Johnson et al., 1996: 432). 
 
It can be observed that until the late 1990s, network research on corporate directors had 
been outwardly focused, mostly concentrated on interlocking directorates. Westphal’s (1999) 
research in this period marked an important shift towards the examination of social ties among 
directors within boards of directors. The results of the study showed that friendship ties among 
directors not only do not impede board’s enactment of monitoring, but also facilitate the 
enactment of directors’ advice and counsel roles more effectively, subsequently enhancing firm 
performance. The results also align with Johnson et al.’s (1996) conjecture that the enactment of 
different director roles may equivocally contribute to organizational effectiveness. As reviewed 
earlier in the paper, Gulati and Westphal’s (1999) study extends this line of thinking by 
documenting that interdependence among directors (e.g., CEO and outside directors) through 
social ties can facilitate the formation of other forms of interorganizational ties, such as strategic 
alliances between CEOs of focal firms and those of outside directors. The interpublication 
linkages from Johnson et al. (1996) to Westphal (1999) and subsequently to Gulati and Westphal 
(1999) mark an important shift in the literature from an analysis of external to internal aspects of 
boards of directors and toward a better understanding of directors’ functions in organizations.  
The three studies that follow this stream—Westphal and Milton (2000), Hillman, 
Shropshire, and Cannella (2007), and Terjesen, Sealy, and Singh (2009)—are concerned with 
minority directors and their representation on boards of directors. One of the important 
observations of research in corporate governance is that white male executives largely dominate 
corporate elite circles. Demographic minority representation in corporate elite networks has, 
therefore, become an important topic as part of the ongoing efforts in governance reform. 
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Westphal and Milton’s (2000) study examining demographic minorities highlights the 
importance of social capital in the likelihood of minority directors’ involvement in the 
formulation and implementation of organizational policy and strategy. In the spirit of Haunschild 
(1993), Hillman et al. (2007) showed that organizations are more likely to employ female 
directors on the board when they are tied to organizations that have female director 
representation on their board. Taking stock of this research, Terjesen et al.’s (2009) review 
documents how demographic heterogeneity through minority representation (i.e., female 
directors) on boards of directors influences firm performance.  
 Figure 1 shows that the global main path of corporate elite networks literature signifies a 
shift in the literature, in the most recent decade, to a more comprehensive analysis of directors’ 
social capital. Withers, Hillman, and Cannella’s (2012) review focuses on the director selection 
literature, contributing significantly to our understanding of renewal and relationship formation 
in corporate elite networks. Similarly, Johnson and colleagues (2013) review of the board 
composition literature—with a special emphasis on organizational demography, human capital, 
and social capital approaches—contributes to an understanding of who occupies positions within 
corporate elite circles. More importantly, their research marks the beginning of an important 
methodological transition in board composition research by providing a comprehensive list of 
operationalizations that researchers have utilized to date. In fact, Barroso-Castro et al. (2016), 
who in their research simultaneously examine internal (i.e., co-working experience) and external 
social capital (i.e., interlocking directorates) of boards of directors, use some of the 
operationalizations that have been proposed by Johnson and colleagues (2013). Similarly, Shaw, 
Cordeiro, and Saravanan’s (2016) research simultaneously explores the relationship of director’s 
 31 
human and social capital with firm performance, showing that independent outsiders influence 
firm performance via external social capital. 
Overall, the main path analysis discussed herein shows that there has been a gradual 
theoretical transition from an investigation of external corporate elite networks to internal 
network ties within corporate boards as well as a change in the focus of attention to better 
understanding director roles within their respective social context (Johnson et al., 1996). Most 
recently, an emerging stream of research has begun to jointly explore the influence of inwardly 
(within-organization) and outwardly focused (between-organization) relationships in corporate 
elite networks on organizational outcomes. Empirically, organizational demography, indicators 
of human capital, and social capital have all been examined, both jointly and in isolation, in 
search of the ‘unicorn’ (Johnson et al., 1996: 433), that is, a practically significant and robust 
relationship between corporate elite characteristics and organizational outcomes.  
The main path analytical approach allowed me to not only identify the key contributors to 
the literature and the main knowledge codification and diffusion paths, but also to document the 
theoretical and methodological progression of the field since the early 1980s to better predict the 
future evolution of the field. Table 2 supplements these analyses with a list of top 15 influential 
authors in the field based on global and local citation scores. With a series of publications on 
corporate elite networks in a short period of time, James (Jim) D. Westphal, stands out as one of 
the key contributors to this literature. 
 In the following section, I discuss the main implications of the study and offer directions 
for future research.  
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E. Discussion 
 The purpose of this paper was to take stock of the extant literature on corporate elite 
networks, and in doing so explore where the field has been, where it currently stands, and where 
it might be headed in the near future. I organized my review around three major areas: content of 
network ties, network processes, and network theoretic concepts. I constructed Table 1 with the 
purpose of providing an organizing framework around representative research areas. In the 
second half of the paper, I conducted a main path analytic review of research on corporate elite 
networks and identified the paths through which scientific knowledge in this field of study has 
been transferred since the early 1980s. The research presented herein makes important 
theoretical and methodological contributions to corporate governance research. 
 First, my review of the literature has shown that the management field has made great 
strides in explaining the sources and consequences of embeddedness of actors in corporate elite 
networks. A socially-informed (socialized) theory of corporate governance is still developing and 
it is my hope that the organizing framework developed in this paper will be helpful in integrating 
knowledge that has emerged from studies on corporate elite networks to provide a clearer picture 
of areas that need further development. In the context of boards of directors, researchers have 
already moved towards a socially-constructed view of directors and their roles (Johnson et al., 
1996; Westphal & Zajac, 2013). 
As identified, since the late 1990s, there has been a growing interest in exploring the 
intraorganizational networks of boards of directors, using both expressive and instrumental 
network ties. Nevertheless, this line of research remains significantly under-developed in 
comparison to work on external networks. Barroso-Castro et al.’s (2016) study, which examined 
both internal (i.e., co-working experience) and external social capital (i.e., interlocking 
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directorates) of boards of directors of directors, is an important attempt towards bridging the gap 
between inwardly and outwardly focused studies of corporate elite networks. One of the 
challenges that limit the comprehensive exploration of intraorganizational networks of corporate 
elite members is the difficulty that researchers face in accessing large longitudinal datasets on 
corporate elite ties. In this respect, as Johnson et al.’s (2013) work shows, it would be fruitful for 
researchers to find creative ways for modeling social relationships among directors in the 
absence of direct access to data collected using standard sociometric techniques. Johnson et al.’s 
suggestion for using network methods on archival data still maintains its relevance and validity 
for future research. 
 Furthermore, as expected, global and local approaches to main path analysis generated 
different results. Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 show main paths that were constructed using global key-
route, local backward, local forward, and local key-route algorithms, respectively. For the 
purpose of parsimony, I limit my discussion to the major differences between the results 
obtained from the global main path approach and those obtained from the local (backward) main 
path approach. As shown in Figure 3, the main body and the tail of the local (backward) main 
path (starting from Westphal and Zajac, [1997]) are identical to those in the global main path. 
The major difference involves the split paths that follow from Ornstein (1984) to Zajac and 
Westphal (1996), including the addition of the latter publication in the network. Zajac and 
Westphal’s (1996) work can be considered one of the early studies that explored the interaction 
between internal and external dynamics of boards of directors. Specifically, the authors showed 
that the power dynamics within boards of directors have an influence on the process of the focal 
organizations’ formation of interlocks. Interestingly, the path from Ornstein (1984) to Zajac and 
Westphal (1996) can be reached from two separate links: Ornstein (1984)  Palmer (1993)  
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Haunschild (1993)  Zajac and Westphal (1996), on the one hand, and Ornstein (1984)  
Richardson (1987)  Mizruchi and Stearns (1988)  Zajac and Westphal (1996), on the other 
hand. Given that both Palmer and Richardson share similar interests in their studies—testing 
hypotheses derived from interorganizational and intraclass approaches— the difference between 
these local paths can be attributed to divergent areas explored by Pamela Haunschild, an 
Organizational Behavior and Theory scholar, who in her paper emphasized the influence of 
interlocking directorates on the imitation of organizational strategy (Haunschild, 1993), and 
Mark Mizruchi, a Sociology scholar, who in his co-authored study with Linda Stearns explored 
the economic antecedents of director appointments and organizations’ formation of interlocking 
directorates with financial institutions (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988). As this example suggests, 
main path analysis, with its distinct network algorithms, is a versatile tool for identifying 
different paths of scientific progression in a given field of study. An interesting future direction 
would be to expand the categorical criteria used in this study to include Sociology and other 
related disciplines to explore the main contributions of the Management field to research in the 
area of interlocking directorates. 
 Second, and to the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to utilize main path 
analytic approach in a scientific review of research on corporate elite networks in management 
research. While the technique has been commonly used by researchers in other disciplines (e.g. 
Carley, Hummon, Harty, 1993; Calero-Medina & Noyons, 2008; Hummon & Doreian, 1989; 
Humman, Doreian, Freeman, 1990), there are two known examples that have used this approach 
in research topics related to the field of management research (see Johnson, Ellstrand, & Kepes, 
2006; Lu & Liu, 2013). This study makes an important methodological contribution to strategic 
management and corporate governance research by applying main path analytic methodology in 
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the context of the corporate elite networks literature. Given that the main path analysis is most 
fruitful when analyzing large networks of publications, it would be interesting for future research 
to apply the method to agency theory and resource dependence theory, two dominant theoretical 
perspectives in corporate governance research, to identify key areas, research studies, authors, 
and interpublication linkages that have contributed to the evolution of these theoretical 
perspectives. I hope this paper, in addition to prior work using this technique (e.g., Lu & Liu, 
2013), will provide a valuable template for researchers who wish to use the main path analytical 
technique to construct the paths of the evolution of other research domains. 
F. Conclusion 
I presented narrative and main path analytic reviews of the literature on corporate elite 
networks to more comprehensively examine the main implications of extant research, develop an 
organizing framework, identify key progression paths, and offer directions for future research. I 
hope that the research presented herein will stimulate future efforts that focus on the processes 
underlying network dynamics in the context of both internal and external networks of corporate 
elite members, which continues to be an important, interesting, and impactful research area in the 
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H. Figures and Tables3 
Figure 1: Global Main Path – Standard 
 
 
                                                 
3 Note: In some cases, the distances between the nodes were adjusted to enhance the visual 
representation of the main path. 
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Figure 5: Local Main Path – Key Route 
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Table 1: A Framework for Organizing Research on Corporate Elite Networks 















l Task interdependence as 
an antecedent to tie 
formation among 
directors 
Influence of formal and 
status-based hierarchical 
relations among directors on 
board processes 
Dissolution of board committees 
(e.g., ad hoc committees of the 
board) 
Change in board leadership 
structure and tie reconstitution in 






l Mutual dependence 
among firms as an 
antecedent to formation 
of board interlocks 
Influence of strong vs. weak, 
direct vs. indirect interlocking 
directorate ties on interfirm 
imitation 
Network predictors and 
consequences of board member 
turnover (e.g., jumping ship)  
Environmental uncertainty as an 
antecedent to reconstitution of 





















e Effective use of social 
influence as a strategy 
for developing positive 
affective ties and the 
influence of ingratiation 
on negative tie 
formation 
Structural characteristics of 
informal, intraorganizational 
networks of boards of 
directors 
Organizational, board, and dyadic 
level affective events as 
antecedents of dissolution of 
positive and negative expressive 
ties among directors (e.g., 
demotion) 
Affective tensions, cognitive 
consistency motives, and re-
construction of balance within 








Influence of CEO social 
comparison processes on 













Directors’ degree of 
social identification with 
members of the 
corporate elite as an 
antecedent of positive tie 
formation 
Positive/negative ties among 
corporate elite members as an 
antecedent of interfirm 
collaboration, competition, 
collusion, and co-opetition. 
Executive centrality in friendship 
networks of corporate elite 
members as an antecedent to 
career promotion 
Social affiliation networks (e.g., 
social clubs, business roundtable, 
etc.) as grounds for reactivation 
of dormant ties among members 







The influence of social 
categorization and 
discrimination among 
members of corporate 
elite on negative tie 
formation 
Reduced competitive rivalry as an 
antecedent of dissolution of 
negative ties among executives of 
firms with related task 
environments 
Note: Cells demonstrate representative research topics that have already been or can be studied using a network theoretical lens. Some 
of this research has been reviewed in the paper. Table 1 is presented for illustrative purposes and is not meant to represent a 






































































































































































































































1 Westphal JD 17 3.2 370 23.2 318 1875 124.37 112 23 75 
2 Hillman AJ 8 1.5 114 9.46 102 1019 76.5 74 8 33 
3 Borgatti SP 2 0.4 13 0.85 13 961 63.19 13 1 3 
4 Haunschild PR 4 0.7 111 5.37 105 876 48.04 21 3 19 
5 Davis GF 6 1.1 83 3.67 81 820 40.52 11 5 8 
6 Geletkanycz MA 3 0.6 84 4.54 80 819 50.01 17 2 19 
7 Brass DJ 2 0.4 14 1.05 12 784 63.13 16 1 4 
8 Foster PC 1 0.2 10 0.67 10 750 50 13 1 2 
9 Galaskiewicz J 2 0.4 15 1.1 13 711 51.5 14 1 3 
10 Ellstrand AE 3 0.6 72 3.92 71 704 35.86 23 1 12 
11 Johnson JL 3 0.6 72 3.92 71 704 35.86 23 1 12 
12 Carpenter MA 2 0.4 78 4.78 74 697 46.51 14 3 17 
13 Clark KD 2 0.4 27 1.87 27 688 49.45 0 3 12 
14 Collins CJ 2 0.4 27 1.87 27 688 49.45 0 3 12 



































































































































































































































Westphal JD 17 3.2 370 23.2 318 1875 124.37 112 23 75 
Hillman AJ 8 1.5 114 9.46 102 1019 76.5 74 8 33 
Haunschild PR 4 0.7 111 5.37 105 876 48.04 21 3 19 
Geletkanycz MA 3 0.6 84 4.54 80 819 50.01 17 2 19 
Davis GF 6 1.1 83 3.67 81 820 40.52 11 5 8 
Carpenter MA 2 0.4 78 4.78 74 697 46.51 14 3 17 
Dalziel T 2 0.4 72 5.41 68 574 41.24 17 4 23 
Ellstrand AE 3 0.6 72 3.92 71 704 35.86 23 1 12 
Johnson JL 3 0.6 72 3.92 71 704 35.86 23 1 12 
Zajac EJ 4 0.7 69 3.91 58 375 28.3 36 4 9 
Daily CM 2 0.4 67 3.21 66 688 33.57 13 0 8 
Beckman CM 4 0.7 57 3.21 53 505 34.04 29 2 11 
Hambrick DC 2 0.4 53 2.52 50 335 16.4 8 0 12 
McDonald ML 4 0.7 48 4.04 39 249 21.59 25 8 12 






Appendix A: Search Parameters 
 
Search Parameters: Ebsco Academic Source Complete 
AB (interlock* OR "social capital" OR network* OR connect* OR "ties" OR affili* ) AND TX ( 
"board of directors" OR CEO OR "chief executive" ) AND ( JN(Academy of Management 
Journal) OR JN(Strategic Management Journal) OR JN(Administrative Science Quarterly) OR 
JN(Journal of Management) OR JN(Journal of Management Studies) OR JN(Organization 
Science) ) 
 
TI ( director* OR "board of directors" OR "CEO" social capital ) AND TI social capital AND ( 
JN(Academy of Management Journal) OR JN(Strategic Management Journal) OR 
JN(Administrative Science Quarterly) OR JN(Journal of Management) OR JN(Journal of 
Management Studies) OR JN(Organization Science) )  
 
( TI ( "corporate elite" OR "power elite" OR "business elite" OR "organizational elite" ) AND ( 
JN(Academy of Management Journal) OR JN(Strategic Management Journal) OR 
JN(Administrative Science Quarterly) OR JN(Journal of Management) OR JN(Journal of 
Management Studies) OR JN(Organization Science) ) ) OR ( AB ( "corporate elite" OR "power 
elite" OR "business elite" OR "organizational elite" ) AND ( JN(Academy of Management 
Journal) OR JN(Strategic Management Journal) OR JN(Administrative Science Quarterly) OR 
JN(Journal of Management) OR JN(Journal of Management Studies) OR JN(Organization 
Science) ) ) 
 
 
Search Parameters: ISI Web of Science 
 
TS=("CEO" OR "chief executive*" OR "director*" OR "executive*" OR "top management*" OR 
"top management team*" OR "board of director*" OR "corporate elite*" OR "managerial elite*") 
AND TS=("social capital*" OR "social similarity*" OR "inner circle*" OR "network*" OR 
"social network*" OR "social tie*" OR "network tie*" OR "interpersonal relation*" OR "social 
relation*" OR "board membership*" OR "interlocking directorate*" OR "interlock*" OR "board 
interlock*" OR "joint member*" OR "external tie" OR "internal tie*") AND 









III. Chapter II: Constructing the Strength of Directors’ Intraorganizational Ties and 
Modeling the Antecedents and Consequences of Board Network Characteristics 
 
A. Abstract 
Social interactions within intraorganizational networks of boards of directors are difficult 
to observe. Accordingly, the number of studies that explore intraorganizational networks of 
boards of directors has been dwarfed by the volume of studies that investigate external ties of 
boards of directors (i.e., interlocking directorate ties). The purpose of this study is to introduce a 
methodological technique that allows researchers to infer tie strength of dyadic relations in 
intraorganizational director networks, which allows for the examination of larger board level 
social networks. Drawing on prior research on tie formation in social networks (Liben-Nowell & 
Kleinberg, 2007; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Monge & Contractor, 2001; Rivera, 
Soderstrom, & Uzzi, 2010), behavioral theory of corporate governance (Westphal & Zajac, 
2013), and recent theoretical work in corporate governance research (Shropshire, 2010), I 
identify a set of constructs associated with positive tie formation and strength— social similarity, 
social influence, social exchange, and social history— in the context of boards of directors and 
the objective formative indicators of the latent constructs to construct a measure of dyadic tie 
strength. Using both functionalist and sociological lenses in corporate governance (Davis, 2005; 
Westphal, 1999), I explore the nomological network of inferred director ties by using 
organizational level criteria that are predictive of and predicted by the structural network 





Since Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) influential article that introduced the concept of 
agency costs, effective monitoring of organizational decision-makers has remained a subject of 
great interest in management, creating a vast literature that concentrates on corporate governance 
mechanisms (see Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007; Durisin & 
Puzone, 2009; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Walsh & Seward, 1990 for reviews of this literature). In 
principal-agent relationships, agency costs refer to the sum of monitoring and bonding costs and 
residual losses that are incurred by firms’ principals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) when agents 
engage in opportunistic behaviors such as personal rent extraction, entrenchment, or shirking 
(Demsetz, 1983). Researchers have argued that investors minimize potential agency costs by 
taking advantage of formal governance mechanisms (e.g., regulations, institutional shareholders, 
market for corporate control, boards of directors, etc.) (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Arguably, none 
of these mechanisms have received more attention in management research than boards of 
directors. In addition, some of the most important empirical studies that corroborate the 
management discipline’s major theories (e.g., resource dependence theory, agency theory) have 
been conducted by using boards of directors as a research context (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 
2009; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). Still today, the economic paradigm on principal-agent 
relations pervades much of the contemporary thinking in the strategic management literature 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Aside from the economic paradigm, a branch of governance research characterizes boards 
of directors as social institutions comprised of social actors. As Davis (2005) observed, this 
sociological view (as opposed to the economic view that centers on agency theory) has 
traditionally focused on the emergence of network ties, forged by members of boards of 
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directors. Interorganizational ties established through joint membership of corporate directors on 
company boards, namely interlocking directorates (Mizruchi, 1996), are viewed as channels that 
help distribute resources (e.g., power, control, decision rights, information, etc.) among 
organizations at one level (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), or as evidence for the existence of a 
cohesive social class of corporate elites at another level (Domhoff, 1967; Useem, 1979; 1980). 
Both of these research streams have made important contributions to our understanding of not 
only the meaning of social relationships between organizational decision makers, but also their 
antecedents and consequences. Nevertheless, recent assessments of this literature point out that 
there are a number of important unanswered research questions with respect to the social 
processes underlying the work of corporate directors (Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 2008). One 
major question concerns the internal social capital of boards of directors (i.e., social relationships 
among members of a focal organization’s board); specifically, what is the internal social capital 
of boards of directors, how does it help shape organizational outcomes, and what factors 
generate different types of board social capital? An important objective of this paper is to 
provide answers to these questions. 
Social capital is an emerging concept in research on boards of directors, yet researchers 
have paid disproportionate interest to external social capital in comparison to internal social 
capital of boards of directors (see Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013 for a review of this 
literature). Social capital generally refers to resources embedded in social relationships (Nahapiet 
& Ghoshal, 1998). As such, internal social capital refers to resources that directors access via 
linkages to other members on the board (within-board), whereas external social capital refers to 
resources embedded in relationships with members of other boards (within-corporate elite 
network). Few researchers have been able to obtain access to boards of directors to collect 
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primary data on the social relationships among board members (exemplary research in this 
domain includes Gulati & Westphal, 1999; Stevenson & Radin, 2009; Westphal, 1999; Westphal 
& Bednar, 2005 — for a review of this literature see Westphal & Zajac, 2013). Beyond 
behavioral governance theory research, empirical studies that investigate internal social capital of 
boards of directors typically focus on co-working experience of directors in isolation (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011 — see Belliveau, O’Reilly, & 
Wade, [1996] and Kim, [2005] for exceptions). A comprehensive investigation of boards’ 
internal social capital is absent from the literature due to lack of data on boards’ 
intraorganizational relationships (i.e., the social network that connects the directors on a board). 
Furthermore, the secrecy surrounding corporate strategy and that is at the center of formal and 
informal board discussions presents an important challenge for researchers to overcome in order 
to extend the management field’s understanding of the role of social capital on the boards of 
directors. 
In light of these limitations, another key objective of this study is to introduce a 
methodological technique that allows researchers to infer tie strength of dyadic relations in 
intraorganizational social networks of directors. Based on prior research on network tie 
formation (Liben-Nowell & Kleinberg, 2007; McPherson et al., 2001; Monge & Contractor, 
2001; Rivera et al., 2010), behavioral governance theory (Westphal & Zajac, 2013), and recent 
theoretical work in corporate governance research (Shropshire, 2010), I identify a set of social 
mechanisms associated with positive tie formation and strength—social similarity, social 
influence, social exchange, and social history— in the context of boards of directors to construct 
a measure of dyadic tie strength, using objective formative indicators associated with these 
underlying latent constructs. Next, I outline and empirically test the antecedents and 
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consequences of the characteristics of board ties. In my model, following Westphal (1999), I 
focus on highlighting the complementarities and reconciling the differences between the 
functionalist and the sociological perspectives on board ties (Davis, 2005). The functionalist 
perspective characterizes the structural and compositional evolution of the board at the 
interorganizational level, whereas from the sociological perspective the board’s evolution is 
conceived as an intraclass phenomenon. These two perspectives offer non-overlapping 
antecedents of board social capital and also help make predictions with respect to the relationship 
between intraboard social networks and firm level outcomes. To test the utility of my 
measurement model, I investigate the effects of structural equivalence (i.e., the extent to which 
network actors share similar connection patterns) and cohesion (i.e., the degree to which a 
network is strongly connected) on the board, as well as their antecedents. I focus on three 
organizational level outcomes, CEO compensation, risk taking, and diversification due to the 
importance of these constructs to management researchers and the central role they play in 
corporate governance research — an issue of major theoretical and practical importance as 
excessive CEO compensation, diversification, and risk aversion typically characterize 
organizations with agency problems. 
In the following section, I discuss the processes that lead to the emergence of strong ties 
among members of the board. 
C. Constructing the Intraorganizational Ties of Boards of Directors 
“Most intuitive notions of the “strength” of an interpersonal tie should be satisfied by the 
following definition: the strength of a tie is a (probably linear) combination of the amount 
of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal 
services which characterize the tie” (Granovetter, 1973: 1361, parentheses and quotation 
marks in original). 
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Research on social networks makes an important distinction between strong and weak 
ties (Borgatti & Halgin, 2011). Arguably, the most recognizable and influential use of the strong 
versus weak ties argument is found in the work of Granovetter (1973). The author argued that 
weak ties that network actors possess, especially those that bridge otherwise disconnected social 
entities, are more influential than strong ties in terms of transmitting information to and 
engendering opportunities for the actor. The rationale for this effect is simple, yet powerful: 
“individuals with few weak ties will be deprived of information from distant parts of the 
social system and will be confined to the provincial news and views of their close friends. 
This deprivation will not only insulate them from the latest ideas and fashions but may 
put them in a disadvantaged position in the labor market” (Granovetter, 1983: 202). 
 
It follows from these assertions that tie strength has an important influence on the amount 
and type of information that actors can obtain from their network, and the timeliness with which 
that information may be received. In the context of boards of directors, as in other team-like 
structures, information processing is fundamental to decision-making and its effectiveness is 
particularly important for board’s involvement in strategy formulation and corporate governance. 
Accordingly, analyzing network properties of boards of directors based on a reliable and valid 
measure of tie strength could result in important contributions to research on boards of directors, 
specifically in the domain of organizational strategy and policy. In the next section, I outline the 
mechanisms that engender strong intraorganizational social network ties among members of 
boards of directors. In doing so, I draw from prior research that focuses on tie formation (Liben-
Nowell & Kleinberg, 2007; McPherson et al., 2001; Monge & Contractor, 2001; Rivera et al., 
2010) in social networks, a behavioral theory of corporate governance (Westphal & Zajac, 2013), 
and recent theoretical work in corporate governance research (Shropshire, 2010), to the extent 
that these mechanisms relate to formation of strong ties at the dyadic level in boards of directors 
and are in line with Granovetter’s (1973) definition of strong ties. 
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Westphal and Zajac’s recent literature review concentrated on the “social processes that 
commonly characterize the behavior of corporate leaders as they relate to each other and to their 
constituents,” which are identified as “social influence”, “helping behavior”, “social learning”, 
and “norms of reciprocity” (2013: 611). I draw from this research to the extent that these 
processes relate to the formation of strong ties in boards of directors and correspond with 
Granovetter’s (1973) concept of strong ties. Overall, I consider tie strength as a function of four 
social mechanisms: social similarity, social influence, social exchange, and social history. These 
mechanisms are also consistent with Krackhardt’s (1992) conception of strong ties, in which 
prior history, interaction, and affect undergird formation of strong ties. In addition, they are 
reflective of the three major classes of social network dynamics outlined in prior research: 
assortative, relational, and proximity-based mechanisms of tie formation (Rivera, Soderstrom, & 
Uzzi, 2010). For instance, social similarity is a well-known antecedent to tie formation 
(McPherson et al., 2001). Interpersonal use of social influence helps corporate elite members 
forge new relationships (Westphal & Zajac, 2013). Organizational research suggests that social 
exchange is a process that engenders relationships, which may “evolve over time into trusting, 
loyal, and mutual commitments” (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005: 875). Finally, common social 
history, in the words of Krackhardt (1992), is an antecedent to trust as it engenders behaviors of 
social actors predictable. I should note that I define common social history more than just 
experiences of actors to include physical propinquity or proximity, which have been proposed as 
an antecedent of tie formation (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013; Nahemow & Lawton, 1975; 





Social similarity is defined as proximity of individuals in “sociodemographic dimensions 
that stratify society” or “internal states presumed to shape […their] orientation toward future 
behavior” (McPherson et al., 2001: 419). Prior research has shown that demographic similarity is 
an important predictor of the strength of social relationships in intraorganizational networks 
(Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Reagans, 2005, 2010) and tie formation among individuals 
(Vissa, 2011). A principle of social interactions is the tendency of people to bond with and form 
ties to similar others, known as homophily (McPherson et al., 2001). Extant research 
differentiates between two types of homophily—status and value homophily (Lazarsfeld & 
Merton, 1954). Status homophily is the increased likelihood of contact among people that share 
similar demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, education, etc.). Value 
homophily is the increased likelihood of contact among people who converge on similar 
cognitive, emotional, or behavioral categories such as attitudes, beliefs, and values (Kossinets & 
Watts, 2009; McPherson et al., 2001). 
Governance research suggests that social similarity is an important criterion in the 
formation of ties in the context of corporate elite networks, and it is regarded as an antecedent to 
cooptation among executives and directors. Powerful CEOs have been observed to select socially 
similar directors or otherwise influence the appointment of these directors, as demographic 
similarity is associated with feelings of sympathy and interpersonal attraction, which pave the 
way for enhanced cooptation of directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Based on this literature and 
the ‘robust’ (McPherson et al., 2001: 418) research finding that similarity leads to formation of 
ties, I include social similarity on boards of directors as an important mechanism of strong tie 
formation on boards. 
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Proposition 1: The likelihood that a positive interpersonal tie (e.g., liking) will form 
within a director dyad in a board network is positively related to the degree of social 
similarity between the directors. 
Social Influence 
A branch of corporate governance research investigates the social influence processes in 
the context of boards of directors from the perspective of impression management theory (e.g., 
Westphal, 1998; Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007). This literature suggests that directors in high 
status positions may become targets of social influence through ingratiation, opinion conformity, 
and flattery initiated by relatively lower status directors. One of the underlying motivations for 
the use of social influence tactics, enacted as conformity and compliance, is to develop and 
maintain social relationships (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Lower status individuals may also defer to 
judgment of higher status individuals due to hierarchical relationships established within an 
institutional context. Several studies in corporate governance research have observed that CEOs 
may engage in social influence tactics to extract favorable outcomes, such as increased 
compensation (Belliveau et al., 1996) and the adoption of golden parachutes (Wade, O’Reilly, & 
Chandratat, 1990). Similarly, directors with high prestige power may exert influence on other 
directors with relatively lower prestige power. 
As D’Aveni and Kesner explained: “an individual manager has prestige if he/she has 
interorganizational linkages and interpersonal affiliations that indicate high status. Status, in turn, 
refers to membership in (or social connections to) an elite circle” (1993: 125). Accordingly, 
social influence in the context of boards of directors may be a function of a director’s status 
manifested in the number of external ties to other reputable organizations. In line with this logic, 
He and Huang (2011) operationalized board informal hierarchy by calculating a dispersion 
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measure of the number of outside board memberships of directors (i.e., Gini coefficient). 
Alternatively, Johnson, Schnatterly, Bolton, and Tuggle, (2011) conceptualized a director’s 
status on a board as playing important roles in social, political, academic, military, and/or 
business communities.  
Overall, research suggests that intraorganizational network ties of boards of directors may 
form as a result of social influence processes on boards of directors. Positive interpersonal affect 
elicited through flattery and opinion conformity aside (Westphal & Stern, 2007), actors’ 
engagement in social influence processes enhances frequency of contact, which is an important 
prerequisite of positive tie formation (Granovetter, 1973; Krackhardt, 1992). 
The designation of social similarity and social influence as differential network processes 
is also consistent with Lauman’s observation that:  
“a dynamic tension [exists] between the “like-me hypothesis” (which postulates that 
people subjectively prefer to associate informally with people just like themselves on key 
status attributes) vs. the “prestige hypothesis” (which postulates that people would 
subjectively prefer to associate informally with persons of higher status than themselves 
because, among other things, higher-status persons control more useful and desirable 
resources than ego controls)” (2006: 66, parentheses and quotation marks in original).  
 
In line with these arguments, it can be suggested that: 
Proposition 2: The likelihood that a positive interpersonal tie (e.g., liking) will form 
within a director dyad in a board network is positively related to the degree of social 
status difference between the directors.4 
                                                 
4 A fair criticism of this proposition would be that in the presence of status homophily, similar-
status directors would be more likely to form ties to one another. While there is certainly truth to 
this, drawing from the concept of structural equivalence, it can be argued that equivalent actors 
(i.e. same/similar status) may perceive one another in competition (Burt, 1992; Rothman, Pratt, 
Rees, & Vogus, 2016; Zou & Ingram, 2013), generating tensions in their interactions. In 
addition, prior research provides evidence of formation of heterophilous relationships (Rivera et 
al., 2010). In constructing this proposition, I also followed behavioral governance research 
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Social Exchange  
The concept of social exchange has a long history in both micro- and macro-oriented 
research (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Emerson, 1976). From the social exchange theory 
perspective, individuals are expected to forge strong ties with those they believe are resourceful 
others (Liden, Wayne, Kraimer, & Sparrowe, 2003). Resource-rich directors can provide their 
alters with valuable domain-, organization-, or industry-specific knowledge and/or network 
connections to other organizations or institutions, among others. Prior research on social 
relationships within boards of directors shows that the norm of reciprocity, an important social 
exchange principle, is an underlying characteristic of relationships among members of the board 
(Westphal & Zajac, 2013), especially in the context of advice relationships. This is not surprising 
given that people seek advice from resourceful others. More importantly, Contractor and Monge 
state that “an individual will seek a knowledge network tie with another individual if the other 
can reciprocate and offer something in return” (2002: 251). In boards of directors, instrumental 
relationships among board members can emerge in areas of business transactions, knowledge 
exchange, and advice seeking/giving, among others. 
As research on board interlocks suggests, an important motivation for directors to join 
new boards is to learn from the experiences of others (Mizruchi, 1996). Vissa’s (2011) research 
on entrepreneurial networks has shown that task complementarity among individuals is an 
important driver of network tie formation. Furthermore, it is arguable that directors will have 
enhanced motivation to approach resourceful others on the board, value their partnership, and 
interact with them on a more frequent basis. In this case, tie formation could be driven by the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Westphal & Zajac, 2013), which shows strong evidence for the use of interpersonal influence 
tactics between individuals of different status as discussed above. 
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complementarity between the organizations with which the board members are affiliated. For 
instance, it can be suggested that Steve S. Reinemund, joint director of Wal-Mart and American 
Express, has become an important network partner to both companies’ CEOs when American 
Express formed a partnership with Wal-Mart and its Sam’s Club division immediately after the 
company broke its business ties with Costco. Considering this example in light of Westphal and 
Zajac’s statement that “favors engender positive affect and instigate or perpetuate social 
exchange relationships that transcend mutual self-interest, and which gradually come to be 
perceived by parties to the relationship as a kind of friendship” (2013: 621-622), it can be argued 
that social exchange constitutes an important underlying mechanism of strong tie formation in 
the context of boards of directors. 
Proposition 3: The likelihood that a positive interpersonal tie (e.g., liking) will form 
within a director dyad in a board network is positively related to the degree of social 
exchange potential between the directors. 
Social History 
Individuals are considered to have social history when they have shared a social space 
that allows them to associate and interact with one another. Network theorists acknowledge prior 
social history, frequent interaction, and affect as fundamental dimensions of strong tie formation 
in particular (Krackhardt, 1992). Social history among directors can emerge as a result of not 
only kinship and friendship relations, but also joint involvement in affiliation networks such as 
clubs (Galaskiewicz, 1985), artistic groups or business communities (Werbel & Carter, 2002), 
and non-profit boards or governmental advisory committees (Moore, Sobieraj, Whitt, Mayorova, 
& Beaulieu, 2002). In addition, shared social history with a network member may lead them to 
become a part of another network (Hite, 2005). The underlying argument of affiliation networks 
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leading to new tie formation is that individuals that have a shared history or that have shared a 
social space become relationally embedded in their networks, sustaining these relationships over 
time. Proximate individuals who interact with one another often are also likely to develop similar 
attitudes (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; Pastor, Meindl, & Mayo, 2002) and forge 
relationships over time (Rivera et al., 2010). 
Shared social history may also engender tie multiplexity (Beckman, Haunschild, & 
Phillips, 2004) — having more than one type of relationship (e.g. advice, friendship, direct-
report, etc.), which increases an actor’s embededdness in the network, and his/her overall 
tendency to forge ties with the same actors in their network, a phenomenon often associated with 
network inertia (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006). In addition, prior research has shown that not 
only social similarity, but also physical propinquity (i.e., closeness) can influence the emergence 
of strong ties (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013; Nahemow & Lawton, 1975; Reagans, 2010). In 
the context of boards of directors, Kim (2005) has demonstrated that family, university, and 
regional ties among CEOs are important predictors of organizational performance. Based on the 
arguments outlined above, I identify social history as an underlying mechanism of strong tie 
formation in the context of boards of directors. 
Proposition 4: The likelihood that a positive interpersonal tie (i.e., liking) will form 
within a director dyad in a board network is positively related to the amount of social 
history between the directors. 
 In summary, the social similarity perspective predicts that interpersonal ties form due to 
homophily effects; that is, people are attracted to and form ties with similar others (e.g., 
demographic similarity). The social influence perspective predicts that interpersonal ties form 
based on status differences between individuals—lower status individuals generally defer to 
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judgments of higher status individuals, which may generate interpersonal affect. The social 
exchange perspective suggests that individuals tend to form ties with those with whom they can 
reciprocally interchange resources that are embedded in social relationships. Finally, the social 
history perspective suggests that sharing common social space creates opportunities for 
individuals to frequently interact with one another and to form a sense of intimacy and affiliation 
with others, with whom they subsequently can forge strong ties.  
Using objective formative indicators of the four mechanisms of social relationship 
formation that are outlined above, we can infer, albeit with measurement error, social ties among 
members of boards of directors. One of the purposes of this research inquiry is to demonstrate 
that measuring tie strength at a dyadic level provides opportunities for more fine-grained 
analyses of boards of directors than simple aggregations of these indicators could. The rationale 
is that classic aggregation techniques may result in the loss of valuable information on directors’ 
interactions. Nevertheless, key responsibilities that boards enact (i.e., monitoring, resource 
provision, advice and counsel — Johnson et al., 1996) and that are of interest to governance 
scholars occur in a relational-interactive context, and thus, an examination of board networks 
provides a more comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of the board as a social and 
functional entity. Classic analytic approaches to governance represent, in the words of 
Granovetter (1985), an undersocialized view of corporate governance, which underlies the 
motivation behind recent work in the behavioral governance domain toward developing a more 
socially-informed theory of corporate governance (Westphal & Zajac, 2013). This new direction 
helps not only examine traditional organizational agency outcomes through a socialized lens, but 
also explore new phenomena that may be of interest to agency researchers. In this respect, 
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network properties of boards of directors would be of interest in examining the social dynamics 
and structure of organizational agency. 
In the following section, I outline my hypotheses, building on the conception of tie 
strength that I elaborated thus far. 
D. Hypothesis Development 
The conceptualization of tie strength provides numerous opportunities for analyzing the 
network properties of boards of directors. While a number of network characteristics could be 
explored, I am particularly interested in those mechanisms that may enable or constrain diffusion 
of information within the boards of directors and that may subsequently affect boards’ 
strategizing and policy-making processes. Following prior research (Burt, 1978; 1987; 1992), I 
select structural equivalence (a form of network homogeneity) and cohesion (a manifestation of 
social capital) as two major network effects that have been proposed to influence information 
processing and decision-making in team-like structures, such as boards of directors. Network 
actors are considered structurally equivalent to one another when they have similar patterns of 
ties with the same actors in a network (Burt, 1978; Lorrain & White, 1971). Cohesion occurs 
when network actors are frequently interacting/socializing (Burt, 1978), have direct ties 
(Mizruchi, 1993), or have strong ties (Burt, 1992; Reagans & McEvily, 2003) with one another, 
as in the case of friendship ties among corporate elite members (Useem, 1980). Network 
cohesion in team-like structures (e.g., boards of directors) refers to the extent to which 
relationships are characterized by strong ties. 
Both cohesion and structural equivalence have been investigated in the context of 
contagion (of ideas and innovation) (Burt, 1987, 1992) and thus, could have an important effect 
on the extent to which board members develop similar perceptions of and attitudes toward 
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particular strategies (Roberson & Colquitt, 2005). More importantly, both measures are 
instrumental in understanding the pattern of distribution of strong ties within a network. In the 
following section, drawing from both functionalist and sociological perspectives on corporate 
governance (Davis, 2005), I explore the environmental and organizational antecedents of these 
two characteristics of board network structure and their consequences for board decision-making 
with respect to CEO compensation, organizational diversification, and risk-taking. 
Antecedents of Structural Equivalence on Boards 
The functional perspective on board composition suggests that the compositional 
characteristics of boards of directors reflect environmental constraints/demands on the 
organization (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Zahra & Pierce, 1989). For instance, in 
highly regulated environments, boards of directors may be inclined to appoint members that have 
political connections in order to accrue informational social capital benefits (Hillman, 2005). 
Conversely, in deregulated environments firms may be more inclined to replace departing 
directors with ‘community influentials’ (e.g., faculty members) or ‘business experts’ (e.g., 
outsider-CEOs), rather than ‘insiders’ (e.g., firm’s executives), or ‘support specialists’ (e.g., 
bankers) (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000: 240). As Lynall, Golden, and Hillman point out, 
“resource dependence theorists argue that boards are vehicles for coopting important external 
organizations. An implication of resource dependence theory, then, is that each director may 
bring different linkages and resources to a board” (2003: 418). As a result, tie strength will vary 
considerably among directors, and the likelihood of emergence of structurally equivalent board 
members (those with similar patterns of ties to similar others) will be reduced based on 
variability in the organization’s task environment. Structural equivalence in boards of directors 
can be interpreted as the extent to which board members have similar responsibilities and serve 
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similar functions (Phillips & Phillips, 1998), that is, whether they are ‘substitutable’ to one 
another in terms of their network ties (Sailer, 1978: 75). This is largely different from traditional 
conceptions of diversity or heterogeneity in boards of directors in the sense that structural 
equivalence is a property of relationships or networks, whereas diversity is a property of 
attributes of individuals constituting a collective entity. Accordingly, variance in actor attributes 
(e.g., diversity) and variance in the patterns of relationships (e.g., structural equivalence) denote 
distinct —and potentially additive— aspects of boards. A network may consist of diverse actors 
at a nodal level, but may constitute of a heterogeneously distributed pattern of relationships at a 
structural level. 
I predict that boards of directors of organizations operating under environmental 
uncertainty are likely to have relatively fewer structurally equivalent actors in their 
intraorganizational board network. This may be a result of high turnover rates of directors under 
conditions of uncertainty (Miller, 1993). Director turnover could occur as a response to poor 
performance in changing environments or as an attempt to better align the needs of the 
organization with its environment. Second, organizations that are operating under uncertainty 
may need to appoint directors who bring differential social capital benefits to the board, thus 
creating a relatively heterogeneous board network wherein the strength of social relationships 
varies considerably. Finally, uncertain environments call for organic organizational structures 
that are characterized by relatively low degrees of functional specialization, formalization, and 
decentralized decision-making (Burns & Stalker, 1961). Thus, environmental uncertainty may 
result in the emergence of ‘loosely coupled networks’ (Brusoni & Prencipe, 2001: 1030; Sine, 
Mitsuhashi, & Kirsch, 2006: 122), heterogeneous patterns of relationships, or network subgroups 
with differential average tie strength in each subgroup. Accordingly, I argue that environmental 
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uncertainty (that occurs under conditions of high hostility, high dynamism, and/or high 
complexity) (Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Lukas, Tan, & Hult, 2001) is negatively related to the 
degree of structural equivalence on the intraorganizational network of boards.  
Prior research on the organization-environment relationship suggest that dynamism, 
complexity, and hostility underline the three dimensions of environment (Miller & Friesen, 
1983). Environmental dynamism concerns the degree of change/instability of the task 
environment of an organization (Dess & Beard, 1984). Heterogeneous task environments are 
more complex to manage, and thus create greater levels of uncertainty for organizations (Dess & 
Beard, 1984). For instance, in concentrated industries, wherein competition is reduced due to the 
presence of large organizations dominating the industry, environmental complexity for a focal 
organization is also reduced (Keats & Hitt, 1988) — though I do not assume that competition is 
the only source of complexity for firms, it is arguably the most important type for the majority of 
organizations. Finally, environmental hostility, is a lack of abundance/munificence of resources 
and/or growth opportunities in an organization’s task environment (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Keats 
& Hitt, 1988). In summary, I expect environments that are dynamic, complex, and hostile, to 
have a negative influence on structural equivalence on the board network. Formally: 
Hypothesis 1: Environmental uncertainty is negatively related to structural equivalence 
on the intraorganizational network of the board; that is, greater uncertainty results in 
more heterogeneous patterns of relationships within intraorganizational board networks. 
Antecedents of Social Cohesion on Boards 
The sociological perspective in corporate governance research focuses on the network 
relationships of directors (Davis, 2005). Researchers’ interest in the so-called ‘inner-circle’ of the 
business elites (Useem, 1979; 1980), as a distinct social class in American society, has 
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significantly contributed to the emergence and development of the sociological perspective on 
corporate governance. One of the core arguments of this literature is that board seats in some of 
the largest, most powerful corporations are occupied by a cohesive capitalist class of 
executives/directors, whose interlocking ties connect many organizations, including private and 
public sector organizations and non-profits (Scott, 1991; Useem, 1979; 1980; 1984). 
Accordingly, in contrast to the functionalist perspective, the presence of interlock ties is not 
driven by environmental constraints (e.g., resource dependencies), but rather by the desire to 
facilitate the realization of the objectives of the capitalist social class, subsequently resulting in 
“class integration” among capitalists (Mizruchi, 1996: 279). 
 While interlock research offers an important approach to understanding the existence of a 
presumably cohesive elite social class that is at the center of organizational networks, it does not 
consider the level of integration within boards of directors. By inferring the strength of ties 
among a focal board’s members, I explore the factors that contribute to social cohesion among 
directors in intraorganizational networks rather than interorganizational interlocking directorate 
networks. In light of this, I predict that social cohesion among board members is more likely to 
occur within boards of directors of prominent organizations (i.e., central), for these organizations 
are attractive to members of the corporate elite as mechanisms for enhancing their social and 
economic interests. 
 For instance, it can be argued that large, publicly traded organizations—as powerful, key 
institutions in the economy—attract significant capital resources and play a central role in the 
functioning of the global economy, distribution of welfare, and creation of employment 
opportunities. Executives and directors who belong to the inner circle of the business elite are 
likely to be strongly associated with large organizations that have significant influence on the 
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flow of goods and services, and the total inputs and outputs associated with their respective 
industries. In fact, early research on board interlocks provided evidence that banks and insurance 
companies were central in interlocking networks of boards of directors (Mintz & Schwartz, 
1981). In addition, large organizations offer a fertile ground for the capitalist class to exert their 
influence on political institutions by bringing forth the power of corporations through lobbying. 
The appeal of large corporations in furthering the interests of the capitalist class suggests that 
larger organizations should exhibit greater levels of social cohesion within intraorganizational 
networks of boards of directors, as directors representing the inner circle are likely to cluster in 
these organizations (Useem, 1980; 1984). 
 In addition, organizations that are embedded in their networks are likely to attract 
executive-directors or outsider directors who belong to the inner circle of the capitalist social 
class. Due to uniformity in their goals, it can be suggested that the inner-circle members of the 
corporate elite class will be more strongly identified with and tied to one another in a nexus of 
multilayered relationships (Useem, 1984). A positive relationship between organizations’ 
centrality and social cohesion on boards is a natural extension of the social class perspective that 
was described above. The underlying idea is that boards of directors of organizations that are 
heavily connected will be comprised of directors who belong to the same social class, have 
similar affiliation networks, and converge on similar demographic characteristics. The potential 
overwhelming similarity among directors in terms of the characteristics of their capital may help 
engender strong network ties among them, facilitating the creation of social cohesion within 
boards of directors. Accordingly, I suggest that: 
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Hypothesis 2: Organizational centrality is positively related to cohesion on the 
intraorganizational network of the board; that is, greater corporate centrality results in 
stronger connectivity within intraorganizational board networks. 
Structural Equivalence, Social Cohesion, and Organizational Agency  
The relational perspectives on boards of directors have shown that network 
characteristics of boards predict important organizational level outcomes. Part of this literature 
focuses on how boards’ external networks influence organizational outcomes in the domain of 
governance policy and organizational strategy. For instance, from the connectionist viewpoint, 
which focuses on the content of relationships, past research has shown that CEOs imitate 
interlocked organizations’ strategic investments in R&D to a greater extent when they have long 
tenure as an outside director on the interlocked organization’s board and when the interlocked 
organization’s performance is high (Oh & Barker, 2015). From the structuralist viewpoint, which 
focuses on the configurational properties of networks, Connelly, Johnson, Tihanyi, and Ellstrand 
(2011) showed that organizations that are closer to the center of the interlocking directorate 
network are more likely to adopt strategies of other organizations (i.e., enter the Chinese market 
via greenfield investments). 
 Although not as prevalent as research on interorganizational networks, a branch of 
governance theory focuses on the effects of internal relationships within boards of directors on 
organizational outcomes. For instance, Westphal (1999) has shown that CEO-board social ties 
(i.e., friendship ties) enhance the likelihood of CEOs seeking advice from members of the board 
on issues related to strategy. Perhaps a more striking finding of the study is that boards’ indirect 
involvement in strategy through social ties to CEOs may positively influence organizational 
performance. In fact, research has found this effect to be consistent in different performance 
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domains. For instance, exploring the effect of social ties (i.e., family and friendship) between 
CEOs and board members on organizational strategy, Wu (2008) found a curvilinear relationship 
between CEOs’ social ties to board members and organization’s innovation performance (i.e., 
percentage of annual sales associated with new products introduced to market in a three-year 
period). Gulati and Westphal (1999) found that cooperative ties increase the likelihood of CEO 
engagement in a strategic alliance with home organizations of those directors who sit on the 
focal organization’s board, whereas board control reduces this tendency. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that an important stream of research, consistent with the managerialism and agency 
perspectives, has demonstrated that intraorganizational networks of boards of directors may 
create opportunities for collusion among directors (e.g. Daily & Dalton, 1994). 
In this study, I focus on network characteristics of directors that may be associated with 
organizational agency outcomes. Specifically, I explore how social cohesion and structural 
equivalence, two alternative mechanisms of social contagion in networks (Burt, 1987; 1992), 
influence governance policy and organizational strategy in the form of CEO compensation, 
diversification, and risk taking. A greater degree of structural equivalence on the board suggests 
that directors share similar patterns of network relationships. At the dyad level, two actors are 
considered structurally equivalent to the extent that there is strong overlap between their alters. 
The contagion literature suggests that actors who are structurally equivalent in a network tend to 
converge on similar ideas because of the perceived competition among them (Burt, 1987). In this 
regard, at a micro level, the high degree of convergence that arises from structural equivalence 
may have a negative impact on socio-cognitive processes of boards of directors. Homogenous 
networks with structurally equivalent positions may prevent alternative cognitive models from 
being used in decision processes. This increases the likelihood that organizational agency 
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problems that arise from group-think will be significantly more likely to occur when boards are 
characterized by a high degree of structural equivalence. 
It should be noted that this argument is not uniformly adopted by prior research. An 
alternative case could be made that homogeneity in patterns of relationships within board 
networks may in fact curtail potential agency problems. Research evidence shows that structural 
equivalence, in line with the purported benefits of social similarity, is associated with enhanced 
cooperation at the dyadic level (Milton & Westphal, 2005). In a board network that is 
characterized by high levels of cooperation, agency problems are less likely to surface 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). When structurally equivalent positions (or equivocal network routes) are 
created in a network, the principle of checks and balances may be more strongly imposed, for 
power inherent in network positions is distributed more equally rather than being consolidated in 
one actor. Overall, there is strong theoretical rationale to expect the following competing 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Structural equivalence on the intraorganizational network of the board 
will be negatively associated with organizational agency problems. 
Hypothesis 3alt: Structural equivalence on the intraorganizational network of the board 
will be positively associated with organizational agency problems. 
In contrast to structural equivalence, social cohesion captures the degree of overall 
connectivity in a social network. From a socio-cognitive point of view, it can be argued that 
cohesion may also lead to convergence among group members, as strong ties in a network are 
associated with greater frequency of interaction among network members (Burt, 1987). As 
argued above, the absence of network heterogeneity may result in directors having a limited field 
of vision and understanding of their environment, while creating the potential opportunity for 
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organizational problems to surface. In fact, building on prior social capital research, Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal suggested that “strong norms and mutual identification that may exert a powerful 
positive influence on group performance can, at the same time, limit its openness to information 
and to alternative ways of doing things” (1998: 245). This suggests that high levels of social 
cohesion may encourage agency problems through groupthink. 
In addition, socially cohesive boards that are comprised of members of the inner-circle, 
who participate in a network of heavily tied organizations, may be more likely to favor internal 
governance policies that enhance their welfare as a social class. This intraclass perspective 
suggests that organizations with socially cohesive boards of directors may be more susceptible to 
potential agency problems. Prior research provides preliminary support for this prediction. First, 
evidence exists of active social support among members of the corporate elite (McDonald & 
Westphal, 2011). In this respect, socially cohesive boards may consider compensatory benefits as 
a form of social support or reciprocated exchange. Second, within socially cohesive boards, 
controversial aspects of CEO compensation may be overlooked. Fich and White study strong 
interlocking directorate ties (i.e., reciprocal ties), and suggest that “a reciprocal CEO interlock is 
more likely to be an instrument that enhances a CEO’s private interests and is less likely to be a 
corporate governance feature for advancing the interests of the company’s shareholders” (2005: 
193).  
In contrast to the drawbacks of social cohesion, greater levels of social cohesion on the 
board also imply that the board network is characterized by directors who command a strongly 
interconnected web of relationships. Sustained communication in cohesive networks tends to be 
relatively easier as the exit of one actor and dissolution of associated ties may be overcome by 
other (redundant) relationships in the network. Coleman (1988; 1990), who in network research 
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is generally considered as one of the proponents of cohesive (closed) networks, suggested that 
cohesiveness in social networks produces social capital benefits by imposing social norms and 
sanctions that facilitate coordinated activities. There is also research evidence that cohesive 
networks help transfer information more effectively (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). These 
arguments suggest that socially cohesive boards may be better positioned to curtail potential 
agency costs. Accordingly, I suggest the following competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4: Social cohesion in the intraorganizational network of the board will be 
negatively associated with organizational agency problems. 
Hypothesis 4alt: Social cohesion in the intraorganizational network of the board will be 
positively associated with organizational agency problems. 
E. Method 
Data and Sample 
For this study, I construct a comprehensive dataset, based on secondary (archival) data, 
comprising information on boards of directors of publicly traded organizations, using the S&P 
500 as my sampling frame. I retrieve industry and organizational level data from COMPUSTAT 
and CRSP databases (e.g., financial performance, diversification, risk-taking, etc.). I use 
COMPUSTAT, BoardEx, and Execucomp databases as well as the interindustry relationships 
table from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in order to construct the internal network characteristic 
of boards of directors and the characteristics of interlocking directorates. 
Given the centrality of directors’ networks in my study, I began my sample construction 
with the BoardEx dataset. First, I selected all organizations that were identified as part of the 
S&P 500 index in the period 2004–2015, inclusive. Second, I manually checked the 
correspondence between COMPUSTAT identifiers (e.g., company name) and those of BoardEx, 
 79 
and included in the final statistical analysis only organizations that have an active 9-digit CUSIP 
code in the COMPUSTAT dataset. 
Since the construction of tie strength within each director dyad requires a complete 
directors’ attributes table with non-missing observations in each dimension, for the dimensions 
that were not readily (or fully) available (e.g., Related Interlocking Directorate, Vertical 
Interlocking Directorate, Gender, Age, etc.)5 I used mean replacement, internet search, and 
decision heuristics to either retrieve data or impute the missing observations. For instance, in 
constructing the attribute list for each firm-year-director observation, I replaced missing 
observations for the director’s age variable with mean values (mean age was calculated for all 
directors listed in the full dataset on a year-to-year basis). Other research in strategic 
management has similarly used mean-replacement to impute missing observations for executive 
age (e.g., Gamache, McNamara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2015). I retrieved missing information on 
director’s gender via web search (e.g., Bloomberg database, proxy statements, etc.), and when 
necessary, inferred gender information from directors’ names. Similarly, for organizations that 
did not have an SIC code in the attributes table, I conducted an online search to find the 
organization’s designated SIC number. I mean-replaced total assets based on average asset size 
for organizations with similar SIC codes when observations were missing (other strategy 
research has used mean-replacement to impute missing observations related to organizational 
level variables such as executive compensation [Gamache et al. 2015] and acquisition premiums 
[Zhu, 2014]). When the firm did not have a designated NAICS code, I inferred classification 
                                                 
5 An interlocking directorate is considered related when the organizations represented are 
matched at the 1-digit SIC level. In contrast, a vertical interlocking directorate occurs when 
represented organizations have an input-output relationship (i.e., industry A sells input to 
industry B). For more information on this subject matter please refer to Table 1b. 
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based on NAICS codes of organizations with the same SIC code. The resultant table included 
486 S&P 500 firms and 59,627 year-firm-director observations over the 2004–2015 period. Next, 
I retrieved additional data from multiple databases (e.g., COMPUSTAT Financials, CRSP 
Historical Segments, Execucomp) to construct the final panel dataset. One firm was dropped 
from the final analysis because it did not have a corresponding CUSIP ID number. Due to 
missing data on some of the explanatory and dependent variables, the sample size differs for 
each of the regression analyses conducted. I report sample sizes and the number of firm-year 
observations in the corresponding tables. 
Measurement 
 Dependent variables. I used three measures to capture the degree of organizational 
agency problems. Organizational diversification is an entropy measure of product diversification 
proposed by Jacquemin and Berry (1979). This measurement method is commonly utilized by 





where Pj is an organization’s sales in a given year in each operating segment (4-digit SIC) 
divided by its total sales across all segments, as reported in COMPUSTAT CRSP dataset. For the 
purposes of my analysis, I selected only business segments and excluded geographic and 
operating segments. I also did not account for ‘other’, ‘others’, and ‘all other’ and ‘corporate’ 
categories, as these do not reflect segment sales (c.f., Lail, Thomas, & Winterbotham, 2014). In 
addition, I excluded segments with sales that are equal to or below 0 in order to compute market 
shares. Diversification scores in my sample range from 0 to ~3.16, with larger values denoting 
greater levels of diversification. I also excluded organizational segments that cannot be 
accurately classified due to the absence of SIC codes. Segments with an industrial classification 
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code equal to or above 9000, denoting establishments in the public sector, were also excluded 
from the analysis. The measure is computed as a lead variable (that is, measured at time t+1, 
while all other independent and control variables are measured at time t). In my robustness 
analysis, I explored the effects of network characteristics on related and unrelated diversification. 
Related diversification is computed using the same technique; however, this time by dividing 
sales at the 2-digit SIC level by total industry sales within the same 2-digit SIC (c.f., Hoskisson 
& Johnson, 1992). Unrelated diversification is the difference between total diversification and 
related diversification. Agency research suggests that organizational leaders typically engage in 
high levels of diversification to reduce their exposure to risk (Amihud & Lev, 1981). In this 
regard, high levels of diversification could be regarded as a potential agency problem, although 
the degree of unrelated diversification should also provide a more refined analysis of the board 
network and agency problems relationship. 
Second, I used strategic risk taking as an alternative operationalization of organizational 
agency problems. I combined standardized measures of capital expenditures (capx), research and 
development expenses (xrd), and long-term debt (dltt) (c.f., Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & 
Arrfelt, 2008; Kish-Gephart & Campbell, 2015). To ensure that the use of a composite index was 
appropriate, I ran a principal component factor analysis, which supported a single-factor solution 
with an eigenvalue of 1.48 that explains 49.47% of the variance. The factor loadings for capital 
expenditures, research and development, and long-term debt were .79, .62, and .70, respectively. 
Following prior research (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, Campbell, Martin, Hoskisson, Makri, & Sirmon, 
2013), I replaced missing values of R&D expenditures with 0s. Risk taking was measured as a 
lead variable at time t+1. I consider low levels of risk taking, after controlling for firm, board, 
and CEO-specific effects, as a potential agency problem. 
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Following prior research (e.g., Boivie, Graffin, Oliver, & Withers, 2016), I measure CEO 
compensation as the natural logarithm of total CEO compensation (TCD1 in the Execucomp 
dataset), which includes salary, bonus, stock options, and stock grants obtained in a particular 
fiscal year (Zhu & Westphal, 2014). CEO compensation is also computed as a lead variable at 
time t+1. Similarly, I consider high levels of CEO compensation, after controlling for firm, 
board, and CEO-specific effects, a potential agency problem. 
Independent variables. I capture organizational centrality via two proxies. The first of 
these measures is ‘organizational size’, which is operationalized as the natural logarithm of total 
assets. I expect that because of their centrality in the economy larger firms will exert greater 
gravitational pull in interorganizational networks, attracting a more cohesive cluster of the 
corporate elite members. The second measure of organizational centrality is ‘centrality in the 
interlocking directorate network’, which is operationalized as degree centrality of the 
organization in the interlocking directorate network (Freeman, 1978). Degree centrality was 
calculated using the igraph package in R (Csardi & Nepusz, 2006). It was measured based on the 
one-mode organization-to-organization projection of the two-mode director-to-organization 
network. Operationally, degree centrality denotes the number of organizations that a focal 
organization is tied-to in the interlocking directorate network. I included betweenness and 
closeness centrality as control variables to the extent that they were not highly correlated with 
degree centrality (or with one another) to capture the effects of conceptually distinct—albeit 
related—measures of organizational influence in interorganizational networks on organizational 
agency outcomes. 
Following prior research, I operationalized environmental uncertainty via its three 
dimensions—dynamism (instability), complexity, and hostility (inverse of munificence) (Dess & 
 83 
Beard, 1984; Miller & Friesen, 1983)—using a popular technique introduced by Keats and Hitt 
(1988) and the Herfindalh index (Boyd, 1990; 1995). For the purposes of computation of this 
variable, a firm’s task environment is operationalized at the 3-digit SIC code. Complexity is 
measured as the degree of concentration of competitors in an industry (Cooper, Patel, & 
Thatcher, 2013). Following prior research, I measure complexity using the Herfindahl index, 
which is the sum of the squared market shares of all firms (Boyd, 1990; 1995), using non-
transformed sales in a given 3-digit SIC industry. To get a more accurate representation of 
market share, I excluded firms with zero or negative sales in each year. When measuring 
dynamism and hostility, I regress log-transformed industry sales (for the last five years prior to 
any given data-year) on time. To log transform 0s, I added 1 to all values. This also means that 
negative sales were excluded from the computation. The regression coefficient—that is, the 
industry growth rate—represents munificence, which is the inverse of environmental hostility. I 
reverse code this variable, so that higher values indicate greater levels of environmental hostility. 
The standard error of the regression coefficient represents environmental dynamism (Keats & 
Hitt, 1988), wherein higher values indicate greater levels of environmental dynamism. 
The indicator variables that are used in the computation of tie strength for dyadic 
intraorganizational relationships between members of the board and their descriptions are listed 
in Tables 1a and 1b. Tie strength is operationalized at the dyad level using a composite index that 
is computed by summing the standardized scores (Bellieveau et al., 1996) assigned to tie 
formation mechanisms—social similarity, social influence, social exchange, and social history. 
In order to use network algorithms to calculate equivalence and cohesion, I use a median split 
and dichotomized the variable such that a tie between two directors exists when tie strength is 
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above the median tie strength of all director dyads in the sample (see Borgatti, Everett, & 
Johnson, [2013] for a discussion of dichotomization of valued networks). 
I computed structural equivalence based on Euclidian distance, which involves summing 
the squared differences between the columns representing each actor’s relationships in the 
adjacency matrix (Burt, 1976). A lower Euclidean distance score indicates presence of similarity 
between the patterns of network connections of dyads, in which case the actors would be 
considered structurally equivalent. In other words, two actors are considered structurally 
equivalent to the extent that they are tied to similar alters. I compute degree of structural 
equivalence at the board level using the SNA package in R (Butts, 2007a; 2007b). This algorithm 
creates an nij by nij matrix for each firm-board-year where n is the number of nodes on the board 
network, i is an organization’s identification number, and j is year. I calculated mean scores for 
each matrix (after excluding the diagonal) to get an average equivalence score in any given firm-
board-year observation. To ease interpretation, I reverse coded equivalence, such that a higher 
value indicates lower average Euclidean distance; that is, higher levels of structural equivalence 
(or greater network homogeneity) on the board. 
I compute social cohesion on the board of directors as the degree of vertex connectivity 
(Moody & White, 2003), using a network algorithm included in the igraph package in R (Csardi 
& Nepusz, 2006), and I also used average tie strength (McFadyen, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2009) 
for an alternative analysis. Vertex connectivity captures the robustness of a network to 
disruptions in the sense that it computes the number of nodes that need to be deleted from a 
graph to disconnect the network (Moody & White, 2003). Ceteris paribus, it would require more 
nodes to be deleted to disconnect a strongly connected network and as Moody and White suggest 
“a collectivity is structurally cohesive to the extent that the social relations of its members hold it 
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together” (2003: 106). Lastly, average tie strength is computed by taking the average of all 
vectors in the adjacency matrix for a given board in each year. 
Control variables. In the regression models reported in Tables 3 and 4, I control for a set 
of variables that could potentially influence the agency-related dependent variables (i.e., CEO 
compensation, diversification, and risk taking). First, when testing Hypotheses 3 and 4, I control 
for environmental uncertainty (i.e., dynamism, hostility, and complexity) and organizational 
centrality measures (i.e., organization size and interlock centrality), which were specified as 
explanatory variables in testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. The rationale for the inclusion of these 
variables as controls is that strategy and policy decisions are influenced by both internal and 
external characteristics of organizations (Child, 1972). In addition to degree centrality, I included 
closeness centrality of organizations in the interlocking directorate to account for organizations’ 
proximity to others in their network (Freeman, 1978). Strategy and policy decisions may also be 
influenced by the information that organizations can obtain from their alters and closeness 
centrality could be an important determinant of the type and amount of information that 
organizations can acquire. 
Second, following meta-analytic reviews of the compensation literature, I control for 
prior year organizational performance, measured as Tobin’s q [at – {(ceq + (csho*prcc_ft)}] 
(Humphery-Jenner, 2014) and return on investment [net income / icapt], which could potentially 
affect CEO compensation (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). These variables were 
also included in the analysis of organizational strategy variables of risk taking and 
diversification, given the association between performance and diversification (Hoskisson & 
Hitt, 1990). I control for firm leverage using the debt to equity ratio [dltt / {(at – ceq + (csho * 
prffc_f)} / at], as resource availability could be a potential driver of firm diversification, risk 
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taking, and CEO compensation. To capture a firm’s efficiency in the use of its resources, I 
calculated the ratio of total sales to stockholder equity [sale/teq] and total sales to invested 
capital [sale/icapt] as measures of external and internal efficiency, respectively.6 
I also control for a series of variables that have been proposed to influence total CEO 
compensation including CEO duality, board size, and degree of independence (see Essen, Otten, 
& Carberry, 2015: 175 for a detailed description of these measures). Given that the structural and 
compositional dimensions of boards can influence directors’ enactment of not only monitoring, 
but also resource provision role (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Johnson et al., 1996), I included these 
measures as controls in the analysis of risk taking and diversification. I included average number 
of female directors on the board, average age of directors on the board, and the average number 
of overlap in directors’ tenures on the board as proxies for board dynamics. Overall, by 
incorporating these measures in my model specification, I aimed to ensure that network-based 
constructs have predictive validity above and beyond variables that have been typically 
associated with organizational agency outcomes in prior governance research. In addition, I 
included CEO level variables such as age and gender to capture differences in CEO’s strategic 
choices and compensation outcomes. Finally, to capture power dynamics within boards, I 
controlled for alternative operationalizations of network centralization, such as degree and 
betweenness centralization, to the extent that they are not highly intercorrelated with one 
another— a decision rule that I applied when including centrality measures of interlocking 
directorate networks. CEO pay was only included as a control variable in the analyses of 
diversification and risk taking. I ensured that none of the variables included in my model 
                                                 
6 More detailed information on these ratios can be found in WRSD Industry Financial Ratio 
manual made available by WRDS Research Team (2016). 
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specification has a covariance of .70 or above. The variance inflation factor statistics are also 
presented in the results section.  
When testing the antecedents of social cohesion and structural equivalence (i.e., 
Hypothesis 1 and 2), I used organizational performance, the number of observed relationships, 
board centralization, CEO duality and pay, and interlocks closeness in the prior year as control 
variables. The rationale for the inclusion of these control variables is that they could potentially 
influence tie formation and dissolution processes in the intraorganizational network of boards. 
High performing organizations may be subjected to inertial forces that may necessitate fewer 
changes in their intraboard networks than those of poor performing organizations (Greve, 1998). 
Given the influence of network density in the formation of subsequent network relationships 
(Kim, Howard, Pahnke, & Boeker, 2016), I include number of edges at time t as a predictor of 
network cohesion and structural equivalence at time t+1.  
Degree and betweenness centralization were included in the model to capture the 
distribution of ties within boards of directors. In centralized boards, the distribution of ties may 
be more skewed, with centralized actors possessing a greater number of connections (Freeman, 
1978). Independent of tie distribution, influential CEOs may exert influence on tie formation in 
boards of directors, so I capture CEO influence on the board using duality and pay as indicators. 
A measure of organizational interlock closeness centrality was included in the analysis to capture 
the potential influence of an organization’s external social capital on its internal social capital. 
As discussed in Hypotheses 2, I expect these two forms of social capital to be related to one 
another. Interlock closeness denote to proximity of an organization to alters in the interlocking 
directorate network (Freeman, 1978). Since the information processing needs of close versus 
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distal organizations will differ, the internal social capital of boards may also show variance 
depending on the position of the organization in the interlocking directorate network. 
Analysis 
To analyze the data, I used a series of fixed-effects regression models with robust 
standard errors, controlling for year effects. Hausman model specification tests (Hausman, 1978) 
suggested that a fixed effects model is the appropriate approach for majority of the specified 
models. A few exceptions to this rule were the robustness analyses, where I used a random 
effects regression with robust standard errors, with year and 1-digit SIC industry controls, to 
explore the effect of board network characteristics on contingent pay, fixed pay, and unrelated 
diversification. It should be noted that the results were virtually unchanged with respect to the 
influence of network variables (i.e., cohesion, structural equivalence) on contingent pay, fixed 
pay, and unrelated diversification whether I ran a fixed or random effects model. 
F. Results 
I began the analysis by examining the correlation tables for evidence of potential 
multicollinearity. Correlations and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2a and 2b. The 
output shows that multicollinearity was not an issue as all correlations were under |.70| and the 
highest correlation was observed between board size and structural equivalence (r = .66). In 
addition, the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics observed for the regression models were 
below 2.4 on average and the highest observed value was 3.48 in the risk-taking model. One 
exception to this observation was found in the random effects model that included industry SIC 
codes at the 1-digit level wherein the dependent variable was unrelated diversification. The 
model generated VIF statistics that significantly above the conventional level of 10. 
Nevertheless, the significant effect observed in the analysis that I reported below remained 
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unchanged whether I ran a random effects model with industry controls or a fixed effects model 
after dropping industry controls. All VIF statistics that were associated with the variables used in 
the model was below 3.4. 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 3 show the effects of environmental uncertainty on structural 
equivalence. Models 3 and 4 show the influence of firm centrality on social cohesion. In models 
5 through 10 in Table 4, I explore the relationship of structural equivalence and social cohesion 
with organizational agency outcomes. Specifically, Models 5 and 6 show the influence of 
structural equivalence and social cohesion on CEO compensation. Models 7 and 8 show the 
effects of structural equivalence and social cohesion on organizational diversification. Finally, 
the effects of equivalence and cohesion on risk taking are reported in Models 9 and 10. In each 
model set [1–2, 3–4, 5–6, 7–8, 9–10], I regress the control variables in the first and the 
explanatory variables in the second step of the regression analysis. The results are interpreted in 
the following section. 
Models 1 and 2 show the results of the test of Hypothesis 1. I did not find evidence of a 
statistically significant effect of environmental uncertainty on structural equivalence on the 
board. Furthermore, I did not observe a statistically significant effect on equivalence when 
dynamism, complexity, and hostility were regressed as a composite index. Interestingly, 
however, I found that firm centrality influences structural equivalence on the board. Both forms 
of centrality (i.e., firm size and centrality in the interlock network) have a consistent negative 
effect on structural equivalence on the board. Overall, the results suggest that while 
environmental uncertainty does not influence board network heterogeneity from a functional 
perspective—indicating lack of support for Hypothesis 1—organizations with greater centrality 
appear to have more homogeneous networks in terms of structural equivalence. 
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Models 3 and 4 show the effect of firm centrality on cohesion in the intraorganizational 
network of boards of directors. In line with the intraclass perspective of interlocks, I argued that 
central firms will have more cohesive intraorganizational board networks. I found that both firm 
size and centrality in the interlocking directorate network influence social cohesion in boards. As 
expected, centrally positioned firms in the interlocking directorate have more cohesive boards of 
directors. This provides statistical support for Hypothesis 2. However, contrary to my 
expectations, larger firms have less cohesive boards. A potential explanation for this finding is 
that due to their enhanced visibility in and greater access to the directors’ labor market, larger 
firms appoint diverse members (e.g., minority status directors, novice directors, etc.) to their 
board, the cumulative effect of which is the emergence of less cohesive board networks. Overall, 
the results of the analysis lend mixed support for Hypothesis 2. 
The competing sets of hypotheses 3–3alt and 4–4alt were tested in Models 5 through 10. 
As reported in Models 5 and 6, I found no statistically significant relationship between CEO 
compensation and equivalence or cohesion. In this respect, when total CEO compensation is 
taken into consideration as an agency problem, no support is found for Hypotheses 3-3alt and 4-
4alt. To further diagnose the issue, I regressed these variables on non-contingent CEO pay. I 
calculated non-contingent pay as the ratio of log-transformed salary and bonus to log-
transformed total CEO compensation minus other compensation. I did not find a statistically 
significant relationship between network measures and the ratio of fixed (non-contingent) CEO 
compensation either. As a robustness check, I also ran a panel tobit regression with random 
effects controlling for industry and year effects, given that fixed pay is calculated as a limited 
dependent variable (i.e., percentage). Again, I did not find a significant effect. Overall, I found 
no support for Hypotheses 3-3alt or 4-4alt in the domain of CEO compensation. 
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Models 7–8 show the influence of equivalence and cohesion on diversification. The 
results show a significant and negative effect of equivalence on total diversification. The effect 
of cohesion on diversification was not significant. To further examine the relationship, in a 
subsequent analysis I used a random effects regression and controlled for industry and year 
effects. I found a significant negative effect of equivalence on unrelated diversification (p-value 
< .05). Interestingly, equivalence and cohesion did not have a significant effect on related 
diversification. Overall, the results reported in Model 8 provide support for Hypothesis 3 in the 
domain of total diversification. In addition, the purported benefits of social cohesion or network 
heterogeneity (i.e., low levels of structural equivalence) were not observed in the domain of 
related diversification. 
Finally, the effects of equivalence and cohesion on firm strategic risk taking are reported 
in Models 9–10. I observed a non-significant effect of structural equivalence on risk taking. This 
result fails to provide support for Hypotheses 3 and 3alt in the domain of risk taking. Importantly, 
there is a significant negative effect of cohesion on risk taking. The results provide support for 
Hypothesis 4, which suggested that agency problems surface when boards of directors have 
cohesive intraorganizational networks. In additional analyses not reported here, I used average 
tie strength and density as alternative measures of board cohesion and found significant negative 
impact of both measures on risk taking. 
G. Discussion 
The purpose of this study was two-fold: a) develop a more comprehensive understanding 
of internal social capital of boards of directors, and b) construct a measure of directors’ dyadic 
tie strength and explore the antecedents and consequences of intraboard network characteristics. 
I addressed the former issue in the first part of the paper by building on social network dynamics 
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research (Liben-Nowell & Kleinberg, 2007; McPherson et al., 2001; Monge & Contractor, 2001, 
Rivera et al., 2010), a behavioral theory of corporate governance (Westphal & Zajac, 2013), and 
recent theoretical work in corporate governance research (Shropshire, 2010). In the second half 
of the paper, I developed a measure of tie strength using objective indicators of social 
mechanisms that create strong ties among directors and tested the antecedents and consequences 
of network constructs that have been frequently examined in social contagion research: structural 
equivalence and cohesion (Burt, 1987).  
The results of the test of Hypotheses 1 and 2 lend greater credibility to the intraclass 
perspective on boards of directors (Ornstein, 1984; Palmer, 1983). Both structural equivalence 
and social cohesion within boards of directors are predicted by organizational centrality rather 
than the dynamics of the organizational task environment. This calls into question the extent to 
which boards of directors promote organizational adaptation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), wherein 
organizations align the composition and structure of their boards with their environment. 
Nevertheless, more conclusive evidence on this issue will require future research to test tie 
formation within boards of directors. One of the limitations of this methodology of tie strength 
inference is that the use of stable dyadic characteristics in the measurement of social similarity 
(e.g., age) makes it problematic to test tie formation and dissolution over time, because the 
degree of similarity does not change in these types of dimensions. It would be interesting for 
future research to separately examine the effects of dynamic-only dimensions underlying tie 
strength. In this way, social exchange and status categories are more conducive to constructing 
dynamic network relationships over time. 
The results of the tests of Hypotheses 3 and 3alt and 4 and 4alt showed that CEO 
compensation has no relationship with cohesion or equivalence on the board, even when 
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alternative measures of cohesion and forms of compensation are used. Cohesion and structural 
equivalence, as network measures, were most influential in the analyses of agency costs in the 
context of diversification and risk taking. Specifically, I found that organizations with more 
structurally equivalent boards engage in lower levels of diversification, while organizations with 
cohesive boards—whether cohesion is operationalized as vertex connectivity, density, or average 
tie strength—engage in lower levels of risk taking. An argument can be made from an agency 
theory perspective to explain these results. First, the results provide some support for the 
argument that high levels of structural equivalence on the board help directors enact their 
monitoring responsibilities more effectively by distributing power embedded in social 
relationships more equally. Second, agency theory suggests that cohesive relationships within 
boards of directors may engender agency problems by undermining the board’s ability to 
monitor management. The results obtained in the analysis sharply contrast with Westphal’s 
(1999) finding that friendship ties do not compromise boards’ monitoring responsibilities. An 
intriguing question that arises from these cumulative findings is under what circumstances 
cohesion could be beneficial or detrimental. It would be fruitful for future research to explore the 
contingencies that influence the relationship between board cohesion and organizational agency 
outcomes. 
H. Conclusion 
The results of the study demonstrate that inferring tie strength from archival data has 
promise to extend current understanding of organizational agency problems. The findings 
suggest that both structural equivalence and social cohesion on boards of directors are important 
predictors of organizational agency problems. Furthermore, the study offers an important step 
toward better understanding the antecedents of board network design from both functional and 
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sociological perspectives in corporate governance. For theoretical parsimony, in this paper I only 
examined a small portion of potentially interesting constructs from a network theory perspective, 
leaving room for future research in this area to build on the findings reported herein. I hope that 
the work presented here will set a precedent for future research using network analytic approach 
in the context of boards of directors.  
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Table 1a: Constructing Intraorganizational Ties of Boards of Directors and Inferring Tie Strength from Objective Indicators 
Indicator Variable Social Similarity Social Influence Social Exchange Social History 
Co-Dependent 1    
Co-Independent 1    
Co-Gender 1    
Co-Oldsters 1    
Co-Youngsters 1    
Age Similarity 1    
Honorific Title 1    
Military Title 1    
Administrative Title 1    
Public Service Title 1    
Pro Directors 1    
Novice Directors 1    
Current Board Seats  1   
Firm Committee Seats  1   
Firm Committee Chairs  1   
Committee Chairs Local  1   
Committee Financial Expert Global  1   
Prestige  1   
Co-Financial Expert   1  
Co-Hierarchical Standing   1  
Related Interlocking Directorate   1  
Vertical Interlocking Directorate   1  
Overlap in Board Tenure    1 










Table 1b: Descriptions of Dyadic Variables used in the Construction of Tie Strength 
Indicator Variable Description 
Co-Dependent Both directors are non-independent directors 
Co-Independent Both directors are independent directors 
Co-Gender Both directors are female  
Co-Oldsters Both directors are within the 75th quartile of the sample in age 
Co-Youngsters Both directors are within the 25th quartile of the sample in age 
Age Similarity Absolute difference in directors age (reverse coded) 
Honorific Title Both directors hold honorific titles (e.g., Lord, Duke, Lady, etc.) 
Military Title Both directors hold military titles (e.g., Admiral, General, etc.) 
Administrative Title Both directors hold administrative titles (e.g., Senator, Governor, etc.) 
Public Service Title Both directors hold public servant titles (e.g., Doctor, Professor, Dean, etc.) 
Pro Directors Both directors are within the 75th quartile of the sample in tenure 
Novice Directors Both directors are within the 25th quartile of the sample in tenure 
Current Board Seats Absolute difference in the number of current boards seats held 
Firm Committee Seats Absolute difference in the number of committee seats held on the board 
Firm Committee Chairs Absolute difference in the number of committee chairmanships held on the board 
Committee Chairs Local Absolute difference in the number committee chairmanships held in S&P 500 firms 
Committee Financial Expert Global  Absolute difference in the number financial expert position held all BoardEx firms 
Prestige  Absolute difference in the maximum asset size of S&P 500 firms on which the directors serve 
Co-Financial Expert Both directors are financial experts on the board (assumed communication link) 
Co-Hierarchical Standing 
Both directors hold hierarchical title on the board (i.e., CEO, Chairman, Lead Independent Director, 
Committee Chair) (assumed communication link) 
Related Interlocking Directorate Other firms on which directors serve are matched at the 1-digit SIC level 
Vertical Interlocking Directorate 
Other firms on which directors serve are vertically related, that is their representative industries (based 
on 2-digit NAICS code) have a non-zero input-output. Bureau of Labor Statics’ interindustry sales 
table was used in the construction of this table. 
Overlap in Board Tenure 
Overlap in tenure of directors [1 – abs(tenure_dir_a – tenure_dir_b)/(tenure_dir_a + tenure_dir_b)]: 
missing values due to calculation error were replaced with 0. 










Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations – Antecedents Model 
# Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Equivalence 2.63 0.51 1.00 
      
2 Cohesion 2.20 1.59 0.19 1.00 
     
3 Tobin's Q log 0.59 0.48 0.17 -0.11 1.00 
    
4 ROI 0.11 0.16 0.03 0.02 0.33 1.00 
   
5 Board Edges 56.58 37.59 -0.28 0.57 -0.21 0.00 1.00 
  
6 Degree Centralization 0.39 0.15 -0.27 -0.22 0.02 0.01 -0.09 1.00 
 
7 Betw. Centralization 0.24 0.17 -0.04 -0.47 0.12 0.00 -0.44 0.60 1.00 
8 CEO Total Pay log 8.86 1.29 -0.09 0.13 -0.08 0.03 0.17 0.00 -0.10 
9 CEO Duality 0.59 0.49 -0.02 0.13 -0.06 0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.06 
10 Dynamism 0.05 0.05 -0.07 0.08 -0.19 -0.04 0.13 0.01 -0.05 
11 Complexity 0.81 0.21 0.15 -0.04 0.15 0.01 -0.19 0.00 0.06 
12 Hostility -3.11 0.15 -0.07 -0.03 -0.12 -0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 
13 Org. Int. Close Cent -0.10 0.91 -0.18 0.18 -0.03 0.04 0.21 0.04 -0.14 
14 Org. Int. Degree Cent 3.96 3.37 -0.23 0.41 -0.08 0.07 0.50 0.02 -0.34 
15 Org. Size log 9.52 1.44 -0.31 0.29 -0.53 -0.08 0.47 -0.01 -0.24 
Note: Correlations and descriptive statistics Equivalence (first column) were calculated based on 4657 firm-year observations All 
other statistics were calculated based on 4658 firm-year observations. 
 
Table 2a (Cont.) 
# Variable 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
8 CEO Total Pay log 1.00 
       
9 CEO Duality 0.10 1.00 
      
10 Dynamism 0.03 0.02 1.00 
     
11 Complexity 0.00 -0.03 -0.47 1.00 
    
12 Hostility -0.01 0.05 0.47 -0.29 1.00 
   
13 Org. Int. Close Cent 0.16 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.00 1.00 
  
14 Org. Int. Degree Cent 0.23 0.15 0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.48 1.00 
 
15 Org. Size log 0.23 0.11 0.25 -0.17 0.15 0.27 0.51 1.00 
Note: Correlations and descriptive statistics Equivalence (first column) were calculated based on 4657 firm-year observations All 







Table 2b: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics – Consequences Model 
# Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 CEO Pay 8.94 1.23 1.00 
           
2 Diversification 0.80 0.68 0.09 1.00 
          
3 Risk Taking 0.05 2.01 0.10 0.11 1.00 
         
4 Dynamism 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.06 1.00 
        
5 Complexity 0.81 0.21 0.01 -0.03 0.06 -0.43 1.00 
       
6 Hostility -3.11 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.38 -0.27 1.00 
      
7 Org. Int. Degree Cent 3.99 3.36 0.23 0.20 0.44 0.08 -0.04 0.02 1.00 
     
8 Org. Int. Close Cent 0.01 0.99 0.17 0.05 0.17 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.46 1.00 
    
9 Org. Size 9.55 1.43 0.22 0.24 0.58 0.21 -0.17 0.14 0.51 0.28 1.00 
   
10 Tobin's Q 0.59 0.48 -0.08 -0.24 -0.09 -0.17 0.14 -0.11 -0.09 -0.03 -0.53 1.00 
  
11 ROI 0.11 0.17 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.08 0.31 1.00 
 
12 Debt-Equity Ratio 6129.85 21460.38 0.08 0.10 0.52 0.21 -0.20 0.15 0.27 0.09 0.52 -0.24 -0.09 1.00 
13 Efficiency_e 2.60 25.47 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 
14 Efficiency_i 1.47 1.98 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.10 -0.04 0.09 0.06 -0.11 0.16 0.40 -0.10 
15 Board Size 10.70 2.46 0.17 0.11 0.24 0.16 -0.22 0.08 0.43 0.24 0.51 -0.27 -0.01 0.23 
16 Avg. # Independents 0.86 0.07 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.08 -0.09 0.03 0.26 0.21 0.26 -0.15 -0.02 0.08 
17 Avg. # Females 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.03 -0.11 0.06 0.29 0.28 0.26 -0.05 0.05 0.09 
18 Avg. Age of Directors 61.61 3.31 0.16 -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.20 -0.14 -0.01 0.06 
19 Dir. Tenure Overlap 0.59 0.13 -0.04 -0.09 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 
20 CEO Total Pay 8.89 1.23 0.80 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.18 0.24 -0.08 0.02 0.08 
21 CEO Duality 0.59 0.49 0.09 0.04 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.11 -0.06 0.02 0.04 
22 CEO Age 56.32 6.12 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.07 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.12 -0.10 -0.01 0.03 
23 CEO Gender 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.00 
24 Degree Centralization 0.39 0.15 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
25 Betw. Centralization 0.24 0.17 -0.09 -0.08 -0.17 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.33 -0.10 -0.23 0.12 0.00 -0.10 
26 Equivalence 2.65 0.54 -0.10 -0.07 -0.13 -0.06 0.13 -0.07 -0.24 -0.18 -0.30 0.18 0.02 -0.15 
27 Cohesion 2.27 1.72 0.11 0.09 0.20 0.08 -0.05 -0.03 0.40 0.15 0.28 -0.11 0.02 0.12 
Note: Correlations and descriptive statistics CEO pay and diversification were calculated based on 4990 firm-year observations for 








Table 2b (Cont.) 
# Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
13 Efficiency_e 1.00 
              
14 Efficiency_i 0.14 1.00 
             
15 Board Size 0.02 -0.02 1.00 
            
16 Avg. # Independents 0.00 -0.01 0.24 1.00 
           
17 Avg. # Females 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.18 1.00 
          
18 Avg. Age of Directors 0.01 -0.02 0.11 0.09 -0.04 1.00 
         
19 Dir. Tenure Overlap -0.04 -0.03 -0.12 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 1.00 
        
20 CEO Total Pay 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.15 -0.03 1.00 
       
21 CEO Duality 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.10 1.00 
      
22 CEO Age 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.01 0.08 0.23 1.00 
     
23 CEO Gender -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.24 -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.04 1.00 
    
24 Degree Centralization 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.27 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02 1.00 
   
25 Betw. Centralization 0.01 0.03 -0.18 -0.11 -0.01 -0.06 -0.28 -0.10 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 0.60 1.00 
  
26 Equivalence -0.05 -0.02 -0.65 -0.14 -0.14 -0.11 0.42 -0.10 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.33 -0.07 1.00 
 
27 Cohesion -0.02 -0.04 0.28 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.40 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.02 -0.30 -0.57 0.27 1.00 
Note: Correlations and descriptive statistics CEO pay and diversification were calculated based on 4990 firm-year observations for 








Table 3: Antecedents of Board Structural Equivalence and Cohesion 
 
Structural Equivalence Cohesion 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig 
Constant 3.89 ** 3.85 ** 0.31  1.56 
† 
 
0.23  0.28  0.58  0.80  
Tobin's Q log -0.05  -0.06 
† 0.09  0.02  
 
0.03  0.04  0.11  0.10  
ROI 0.03  0.03  0.12  0.12  
 
0.03  0.03  0.09  0.09  
Board edges 0.00  0.00  0.02 
** 0.01 ** 
 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Degree Centralization -0.48 ** -0.47 ** -0.45 * -0.53 * 
 
0.08  0.08  0.21  0.20  
Betw. Centralization 0.18 ** 0.18 ** -0.47 * -0.37 * 
 
0.06  0.07  0.19  0.18  
CEO Duality 0.04 * 0.03 † 0.13 * 0.13 * 
 
0.02  0.02  0.06  0.06  
CEO Total Pay log 0.01  0.01  0.04  0.05  
 
0.01  0.01  0.04  0.04  
Org. Int. Close Cent 0.01  0.01  0.03  -0.01  
 
0.01  0.01  0.03  0.03  




0.01  0.01    
0.02  








0.32  1.69 
** 1.71 ** 
   
0.20  0.53  0.52  
Complexity 
  
0.01  -0.04  -0.06  
   
0.08  0.25  0.25  
Hostility 
  
-0.04  -0.32 
* -0.34 * 
   
0.04  0.14  0.14  
         
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
















        
 
N of firm-year observations 4860  4657  4658  4658 
 
N of firms 482  471  471  471  
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < 0.01 
log = log transformed
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Table 4: Consequences of Board Structural Equivalence and Cohesion 
 
CEO Total Pay log Total Diversification Risk Taking 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Variable Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig 




















































































































































































































































































































  0.42   0.41   0.21   0.21   0.36   0.36   










Table 4 (Cont.) 
 
CEO Total Pay log Total Diversification Risk Taking 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Variable Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig Coef Sig 
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0.08 
   
0.03 






   
0.01 
   
-0.04 * 
   
0.01 
   
0.01 
   
0.02 
 
             Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
































N of firms 473   473   404   404   473   473   
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < 0.01 








IV. Chapter III: Networks within Networks: Interorganizational Imitation of Corporate 
Strategic Activity via Directors’ Intra- and Interorganizational Network Ties 
 
A. Abstract 
Do interlocked organizations converge on similar strategies as ideas diffuse in 
organizational environments? Research on interorganizational networks has provided important 
evidence that to cope with competitive uncertainty, interlocked organizations imitate one 
another’s strategic choices. Building on this notion, this paper examines imitation of corporate 
strategic decisions among interlocked organizations, while accounting for the influence of 
interlocking directors’ embeddedness in intraorganizational board networks and the 
characteristics of these networks. By exploring imitation through a focus on the intersection of 
intra- and interorganizational networks of directors, I provide an empirical test of the notion that 
interlocking directorates may transfer corporate-level information more effectively depending on 
the characteristics of intraorganizational board networks, contributing to our understanding of the 
conditions that make interlocking directorates matter. Results show that prior acquisition activity 
of an organization’s alters in the interlocking directorate network has a stronger influence on the 
focal organization’s subsequent acquisition activity when interlocking directors occupy central 








Interlocking directorates are one of the more comprehensively studied networks in the 
strategic management literature. An interlocking directorate, or more commonly board interlock, 
is an interorganizational network relationship formed when a director becomes affiliated with 
two or more boards of directors (Mizruchi, 1996; Scott, 1991; 1997). The analysis of these 
affiliation networks has a long history, dating back to the early 20th century (Scott, 1997).7 Much 
of the initial interest in interlocking directorates is attributable to their legal and socio-political 
implications. Interlocking directorates can be consequential to interorganizational competition, 
for instance, when organizations representing intraindustry interlocks engage in collusion 
(Bazerman & Schoorman, 1983; Buch-Hansen, 2014). Interlocks were also regarded as central to 
our understanding of the social structure of power and control, and the allocation of resources 
embedded within interorganizational linkages (Domhoff, 1967; Useem, 1979). 
In the latter half of the last century, management theorists have considered interlocking 
directorates as instruments of cooptation and coordination (Allen, 1974; Aldrich, 1979; Burt, 
Christmen, & Kilburn, 1980; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), highlighting their key role in 
organizations’ enactment of their environments. Director interlocks are mechanisms that 
facilitate the management of environmental uncertainties (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). But they 
also serve an alternative purpose: they are conduits for the transfer of knowledge-based resources 
(Mariolis & Jones, 1982), a byproduct of which is deliberate or inadvertent diffusion of strategic 
decisions among organizations (Shropshire, 2010). As the early research on organizational 
contagion and diffusion has demonstrated (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild & 
                                                 
7 In their analysis of corporate elite networks, Chu and Davis (2016) suggest that Brandeis’s 
(1914) work marks the beginning of the rise in scholarly work on interlocking directorates. 
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Beckman, 1998; Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993; Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001), 
interlocking directorates can influence organizational decisions in areas of corporate, 
competitive, and cooperative strategy as well as organizational structure. As more recent studies 
show (Connelly, Johnson, Tihanyi, & Ellstrand, 2011; Tuschke, Sanders, Hernandez, 2014; Zhu, 
2013), corporate expansion decisions (e.g., mergers and acquisitions, foreign market entry, etc.) 
are still of major interest to research on interlocking directorates and organizational imitation. 
 A critical assumption of the literature on interorganizational imitation and diffusion of 
corporate strategic activity is that members of the board fulfilling the interlocking directorship 
role are well-positioned to extract knowledge from one organization and disseminate it to 
another (Palmer & Barber, 2001). The argument that resonates within much of the interlock 
literature is that the likelihood of knowledge transfers between a focal organization (ego) and its 
ties (alters) increases significantly when the focal organization and its alters are interlocked. 
Institutional theory’s contention that when faced with uncertainty organizations undertake 
isomorphic change by adopting design elements and features of other organizations in their 
environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) underlies this argument. Resource dependence 
literature extends this argument by exploring the direction of isomorphic change—the question 
of who imitates whom— incorporating the concepts of power, dependency, and control (see 
Hillman, Withers, Collins, [2009]; Casciaro & Piskorski, [2005], Pfeffer & Salancik, [1978], and 
Zona, Gomez-Mejia, & Withers, [2015] for a discussion of these concepts) in the imitation 
literature. While board memberships are the underlying pipelines through which knowledge 
flows from one organization to another, the literature suggests that prevalent practices emanate 
from central, powerful, prestigious, and successful organizations to alters that lack these 
characteristics (Connelly et al., 2011). In practice, the process of knowledge transfer may break 
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down independent of the characteristics of organizations if the interlocking director does not 
have the means to extract or acquire knowledge (learn) from alters, or fails to put the acquired 
knowledge to use (implement) in the focal organization, a point that was also echoed in recent 
theoretical research on board interlocks (Shropshire, 2010). 
The objective of this paper is to empirically test these ideas by focusing on 
interorganizational imitation of acquisition decisions in the context of interlocking directorate 
networks.8 Recent research on interorganizational imitation and interlocks has begun to explore 
the conditions under which practice adoption by interlinked organizations is more likely to occur 
(e.g., Connelly et al., 2011; Sanders & Tuschke, 2007; Shipilov, Greve, Rowley, 2010; 
Shropshire, 2010; Tuschke et al., 2014). I contribute to this line of research by empirically 
testing whether internal board network characteristics interact with alters’ corporate expansion 
decisions (i.e., acquisitions) to predict a focal organization’s expansion decisions (i.e., 
acquisitions). Specifically, I focus on two network characteristics that can facilitate (or constrain) 
knowledge acquisition and implementation on boards of directors: a) interlocking directors’ 
centrality in intraorganizational board networks, and b) average tie strength of the 
intraorganizational board networks. In so doing, I use network methodology to estimate the 
magnitude of the effect of structural and relational characteristics of intraorganizational board 
networks on interorganizational imitation. The analytical technique that I use has been used in 
prior research on board interlocks, and can be described as the “systematic network analysis 
mapping the social organization of business power” (Carroll & Sapinski, 2011: 180); yet, I apply 
this technique to not only between-organization but also within-organization networks.  
                                                 
8 For the purpose of this paper, I define organizational imitation as the process wherein a focal 
organization’s agents (i.e. directors) become acquainted with, adopt, and implement strategic 
decisions that resemble those of the organization’s alters. 
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I begin with a brief review of the organizational imitation literature in the context of 
board interlocks. In this section, I also present a summary of the research that focuses on the 
relationship between interlocking directorates and acquisitions. I then introduce my hypotheses 
concerning the relationship between network characteristics and interorganizational imitation in 
the form of corporate acquisition activity. I conclude with a discussion of the major implications 
of the study’s findings for extant theory and research. 
C. Interorganizational Diffusion of Corporate Strategic Activity via Board Interlocks 
 Interlocking directorates are dyadic interorganizational ties (Fennema & Schijf, 1978) 
that are formed when a director is affiliated with two or more organizations (Mizruchi, 1996). 
From a functional perspective, interlocking directorates are relational mechanisms that facilitate 
organizations’ cooptation of their environments and reduce environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Cooptation, as defined by Selznick, is “the process of absorbing new elements 
into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting 
threats to its stability or existence” (1948: 34; 1949: 13). Uncertainty occurs when organizations 
cannot make accurate predictions about their environment due to inconsistent information or lack 
of sufficient information (Milliken, 1987), resulting in a major threat to an organization’s 
stability or existence. Dependence on other organizations for the provision of resources is an 
impediment to organizations’ ability to make accurate predictions into the future, and thus 
constitutes a major source of variation and instability (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Theory suggests that interlocking directorates reduce uncertainty to the extent that they 
can serve as sustained channels of resource exchanges among organizations. Coopted directors 
are believed to become sympathetic of a focal organizations’ needs and priorities over time, 
becoming motivated to provide (or facilitate the provision of) resources that are critical to the 
 120 
effective functioning of the focal organization, thus reducing uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Haunschild and Beckman (1998) suggest that board interlocks are omnipresent because 
they possess information-based advantages. The authors ask: 
“[W]hy is the information conveyed through interlocks so influential? Likely reasons are 
that interlocks can be inexpensive, trustworthy, credible information sources. Interlocks 
are low-cost sources in that directors are required for all public firms, and the information 
that comes from a director is thus an inexpensive by-product of such mandated 
relationships” (1998: 817). 
 
A series of studies since 1990s have investigated whether information indeed diffuses 
between organizations, and whether this diffusion manifests itself as interorganizational 
imitation in areas of organizational practices and routines, strategy, and structure. Research to 
date has examined the effects of interlocking directorates on corporate contributions to charitable 
organizations (Galaskiewicz, 1997; Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989), contributions to political 
candidates (Mizruchi, 1992), corporate acquisition activity (Haunschild, 1993; Palmer & Barber, 
2001; Westphal et al., 2001), acquisition premiums paid (Haunschild, 1994), acquisition 
relatedness (Westphal et al., 2001), international market entry (Connelly et al., 2011; Tuschke et 
al., 2014), alliance formation (Gulati & Westphal, 1999), adoption of the position pill (Davis, 
1991), stock options (Sanders & Tuschke, 2007), option backdating (Bizjak, Lemmon, & 
Whitby, 2009), adoption of reformist board practices (Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 2010), 
adoption of the multidivisional organizational form (Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993), and 
executive and director appointments (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Williamson & Cable, 2003). 
Research in this tradition has recurrently corroborated the idea that interlocking directorates are a 
source of external social capital for organizations that engender informational benefits. 
Recent research on board interlocks and interorganizational imitation has begun to 
recognize that the likelihood that an organization will take advantage of informational benefits 
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from their social context is contingent on the characteristics of interlocking directorates. For 
instance, studying the multi-wave diffusion of board practices in Canada, Shipilov and 
colleagues (2010) found that the effect of interlocks on mimetic adoption (in the second wave) 
diminishes for organizations that have already adopted some of these reformist practices (in the 
first wave). Connelly and colleagues (2011) found that the likelihood of mimicry among 
interlocked organizations in terms of international market entry is higher when prior adopters 
have been successful with the use of the strategy. Tuschke and colleagues (2014) investigated 
whether the characteristics of interlocking directorates and those of interlocked directors explain 
the differential rate at which boards mimic other organizations’ market entry choices. The 
authors distinguished between three types of interlocks: incoming, ongoing, and indirect, and 
examined their interaction with a) type of learning experience, b) type of director forming the 
interlock, and c) focal firm’s prior experience with the target market. Recently, Shropshire 
argued that interorganizational diffusion, that is transfer of knowledge among organizations, is 
more likely “[…] when interlocking directors are more likely to have and contribute their 
experience in the boardroom […], and […] when that outside knowledge is more likely to 
influence board decision making […]” (2010: 249). The abovementioned empirical studies 
provide important evidence for these contentions. 
In this study, I focus on interorganizational imitation of corporate strategic activity, 
particularly acquisition activity. Acquisitions are long-term strategic decisions that involve the 
use of significant organizational resources in the purchase of a controlling stake at target 
organizations. They are ubiquitous, albeit difficult to implement, corporate strategic actions that 
organizations undertake to expand inorganically and to acquire new resources (Hitt & Ireland, 
1985). Acquisitions may help not only reduce organizations’ dependence in their resource 
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environments (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), but also create “market imperfections” 
(Wernerfelt, 1984: 175) and develop synergies [with target organizations] (Barney, 1988) as a 
basis of competitive advantage in the post-acquisition period. 
Given their long-term consequences on an organization’s strategic orientation, the 
decision to acquire another organization confronts leaders with uncertainty. Searching and 
selecting the right acquisition target, assessing the target’s resources in terms of their quality as 
well as relatedness to and compatibility with those of the focal organization may all represent 
major sources of uncertainty for strategic leaders. One efficient way for organizations to deal 
with uncertainty underlying acquisitions is to adopt decision outcomes of other organizations as 
part of a vicarious learning process (Tuschke et al., 2014). Prior research using relational 
perspectives (e.g., organizational learning, network theory, institutional theory) on acquisitions 
has shown that a focal organization’s acquisition decisions are indeed not isolated from those of 
other organizations in their environment. As mentioned above, organizations that are connected 
via interlocking directorates have been shown to imitate one another’s acquisition strategies with 
respect to total number of acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993; Westphal et al., 2001), acquisition 
premiums (Haunschild, 1994), and type of acquisitions (i.e., related/unrelated acquisitions, see 
Westphal et al., [2001] for a description). Furthermore, as Palmer and Barber (2001) have shown 
directors’ network embeddedness (e.g., social club memberships, outgoing ties to interlocked 
alters) is a predictor of corporate acquisition activity, especially during waves of elevated 
acquisition activity among industry organizations. 
Following this line of research, in this study, I focus on organizations’ decisions to 
engage in acquisitions, that is, corporate acquisition activity. For this study, I define corporate 
acquisition activity as the cumulative set of expansion decisions that a focal organization 
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commits to in a (given) period and that it completes over time by purchasing a controlling stake 
of another organization. Boards of directors are believed to be maximally involved in the 
strategic decision-making process in the case of acquisitions (Westphal et al., 2001), considering 
the fact that these decisions are highly scrutinized by investors, shareholders, media, and other 
important stakeholder groups. In the context of acquisition decisions, the forces underlying 
mimetic isomorphic change in the form of adoption of other connected organizations’ decision 
outcomes is likely to be strong in magnitude, facilitating interorganizational imitation— a 
contention that has been corroborated in prior research (Haunschild, 1993; Westphal et al. 2001). 
Below, I discuss how a consideration of the characteristics of intraorganizational board networks 
adds to our understanding of the extent to which interlocked organizations imitate one another’s 
decision to engage in acquisitions. 
D. Intraorganizational Board Networks and Interorganizational Imitation 
Beyond protecting the collective rights of stakeholders by mitigating the risk of 
opportunistic executive behaviors, directors are responsible for the provision of resources to 
executives, typically in the form of strategic advice and counsel (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). The extent to which 
board members can effectively perform their duties is said to be a function of their expertise, 
among other factors (Hambrick, Misangyi, & Park, 2015). Directors rich in human and social 
capital are believed to be better positioned to provide management with information that is 
directly relevant to the organization’s strategic direction. To this end, Haynes and Hillman 
(2010) have demonstrated that board capital (i.e., human capital, social capital) affects strategic 
change in organizations, an effect that is also contingent on the CEO’s power. Moreover, the 
effects of human and social capital could be additive or multiplicative in some circumstances. 
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For instance, Kor and Sundaramurthy (2008) showed that board capital is an important predictor 
of organizational expansion strategies. More importantly, the authors found that the effect of 
directors’ industry-specific human capital on organizational growth is contingent on their levels 
of both external social capital (measured as the number of outside directorships) and internal 
social capital (measured as tenure on the board). The latter point is important in that Kor and 
Sundaramurthy’s (2008) study is one of the few studies that have examined the interaction 
effects of internal and external social capital of the board. 
In a conceptual paper, Shropshire (2010) outlined several intraorganizational factors that 
facilitate the transfer of knowledge from a focal organization to a tied-to organization in an 
interlocking directorate. The author suggests that a director’s ability to partake in the process of 
diffusion is contingent on the interlocking director’s: a) access to the CEO, b) experience with 
minority directors, c) committee membership, d) depth and/or breadth of experience, and e) 
status. Several of these categories are relational in nature, necessitating the examination of 
boards of directors’ intraorganizational networks. For instance, prior experience with minority 
directors implies social similarity and potential interpersonal attraction, which are important to 
knowledge transfers (Darr & Kurtzberg, 2000; Levin & Cross, 2002). Similarly, committee 
memberships constitute the basis of task-based proximity networks in which directors interact 
with one another when enacting their responsibilities (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994). 
Following this line of thought, an interlocking director’s superior access to knowledge in 
the intraorganizational network in which he/she is embedded should affect the extent to which 
the director understands organizational strategies being implemented, and transfers and utilizes 
that knowledge on the focal organizations’ boards. In network theory terminology, superior or 
preferential access to knowledge is a function of a director’s position within their networks, 
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namely their network centrality. Network centrality can be broadly conceptualized as the extent 
to which an actor is better connected than other actors in his/her network (Freeman, 1978). 
Individuals who are central in their networks can enjoy social capital benefits in various different 
forms, including a) access to a greater number of alters with knowledge, b) autonomous access to 
alters with knowledge, and c) control of other network actors’ access to alters with knowledge 
(Brass, 1984; Burt, 1992; Freeman, 1978). In this study, I focus on betweenness centrality, which 
is the extent to which individuals are connected in ways that allow them to control flows in 
knowledge networks in ways that reduce their dependence on others, while increasing the 
dependence of other actors on them (Brass, 1984). 
In line with network theory, I contend that betweenness centrality of interlocking 
directors on their focal organization’s board and those of its alters will influence their ability to 
acquire from and disseminate knowledge to others in their network. In small group contexts, 
such as boards of directors, wherein power possession and allocation is of crucial importance to 
decision-making, knowledge embedded in relationships constitutes a critical source of director 
social capital. The ability to tap into knowledge embedded in relationships and to control flows 
of knowledge within the context of board networks should affect the extent to which directors 
can influence strategic decision-making processes. Accordingly, knowledge transfers between 
organizations and subsequent interorganizational mimicry of organizational strategies should be 
a function of: a) a director’s control of knowledge flow channels on the focal organization’s 
boards of directors, b) a director’s control of knowledge flow channels on alters’ boards of 
directors, and c) the interaction of former with the latter. Formally stated: 
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Hypothesis 1: Interlocking directors’ betweenness centrality in the focal organization’s 
intraboard network positively moderates the extent to which alters’ prior acquisition 
experience will influence the focal organization’s subsequent acquisition strategy. 
Hypothesis 2: Interlocking directors’ betweenness centrality in the alters’ intraboard 
network positively moderates the extent to which alters’ prior acquisition experience will 
influence the focal organization’s subsequent acquisition strategy. 
Hypothesis 3: The positive moderating effect of interlocking directors’ betwenness 
centrality in the focal organization’s intraboard network on the relationship between 
alters’ prior acquisition experience and the focal organization’s subsequent acquisition 
strategy will be stronger the higher the interlocking directors’ betwenness centrality in 
the alters’ intraboard network. 
Another key assumption in organizational research is that top executives and board 
members of organizations are collectives that have team-like properties, such that every actor is 
connected to every other actor within these groups. Research has challenged this assumption by 
suggesting that decision-making units involving the upper echelon of the organization may be 
characterized by fluid participation (Arendt, Priem, & Ndofor, 2005). This suggests that there 
might be a discrepancy between what directors may do and what they can do in terms of 
acquiring or providing boards of directors with knowledge of alters’ practices. This discrepancy 
has generally been unaccounted for in research on interorganizational imitation. As prior 
research has highlighted, social capital has a key role in the creation of new knowledge 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Therefore, the relational properties of network ties within an 
organizational knowledge processing unit, such as a board of directors, will have an important 
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influence on the extent to which knowledge that pertains to organizational strategy can be 
transferred between pairs of organizations.  
 Intangible resources such as tacit knowledge are more easily understood by and 
transferred among network participants when the network is cohesive (Hansen, 1999; Reagans & 
McEvily, 2003). Strength of relationships constitutes one way of conceptualizing cohesiveness in 
networks. Ceteris paribus, individuals who spend more time together, who like and trust each 
other, and who share common history are more strongly connected to one another (Granovetter, 
1973; Krackhardt, 1992). Westphal’s (1999) research has provided important evidence that 
knowledge transfers in the form of solicitation and acquisition of advice between CEOs and 
directors are more likely to occur when friendship ties exist between these actors, and friendship 
implies a strong tie in the context of boards of directors. Strong ties provide actors with affective 
motivations (e.g., trust, reciprocity, etc.) to undertake the processes of soliciting and sharing 
knowledge with others. Accordingly, a network that is characterized by weak ties may reduce the 
likelihood that directors will be able to engage in knowledge acquisition in their role as members 
of the boards of directors of the focal organization’s alters. Similarly, these directors may be 
unable to effectively transfer knowledge obtained from the alters to the focal organization, if the 
focal organization’s network is characterized by a cluster of weak ties. Formally stated, I expect 
that: 
Hypothesis 4: The average degree of tie strength within a focal organization’s 
intraboard network positively moderates the extent to which alters’ prior acquisition 
experience will influence the focal organization’s subsequent acquisition strategy. 
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Hypothesis 5: The average degree of tie strength within alters’ intraboard networks 
positively moderates the extent to which alters’ prior acquisition experience will 
influence the focal organization’s subsequent acquisition strategy. 
Hypothesis 6: The positive moderating effect of the average degree of tie strength within 
a focal organization’s intraboard network on the relationship between alters’ prior 
acquisition experience and the focal organization’s subsequent acquisition strategy will 
be stronger the higher the average degree of tie strength within alters’ intraboard 
networks. 
E. Method 
Data and Sample 
The population of interest for this study is publicly traded organizations listed in the 
United States stock exchanges. Publicly traded organizations are of interest as boards of directors 
are of particular significance under conditions of separation of ownership and control (Berle & 
Means, 1932). The sampling frame for the study includes S&P 500 index organizations for the 
twelve-year period between 2004 and 2015. Organizational and industry-level data were 
retrieved from COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. I used secondary (archival) data obtained 
from BoardEx and Execucomp as the primary sources of corporate governance-related data (e.g., 
boards of directors, CEOs, etc.). Data on acquisition activity were retrieved from the SDC 
Platinum – Thompson Reuters database. 
In constructing the final sample, I constrained my analysis to organizations that were 
identified as members of the S&P 500 index in the BoardEx dataset. This yielded a total of 486 
firms. Next, I limited my analysis to those organizations that could be matched with a CUSIP 
identification number in the SDC Platinum dataset. The final sample used in the analysis stage 
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(testing Hypotheses 1 through 6) consisted of 367 S&P 500 organizations and 3,372 firm-year 
observations. 
Measurement 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in this study is the total number of 
acquisitions announced by the focal firm in a given year. An organization is considered to have 
announced an acquisition when the CUSIP number of the acquirer reported in the transaction 
data from SDC Platinum matches that of the focal organization in the governance dataset. I 
constrained the analysis to transactions involving the purchase of at least 10% shares in the target 
firm to avoid including potential portfolio investments.9 I also excluded self- or defensive-
tenders, stock repurchases, and spin-offs. Finally, I focused on only completed acquisitions.  
For any given year, if an organization was not associated with an announced acquisition 
listed in the SDC Platinum dataset, it received a score of 0 on total acquisitions during that year, 
suggesting that it did not engage in acquisitions in the particular year. As suggested before, 
acquisitions have been commonly used by researchers in the context of imitation and diffusion, 
as they are considered organizational strategic decisions that are susceptible to strong mimetic 
isomorphic forces because they entail high levels of risk and uncertainty (e.g., Haunschild, 1993; 
Westphal et al. 2001). Similar to prior research in this area (e.g., Haunschild, 1993; Westphal et 
al. 2001, I consider a significant effect of prior total acquisitions by alters on subsequent total 
acquisitions of the focal organization as evidence of interorganizational imitation. Accordingly, 
the dependent variable was measured as a lead variable at time t+1, while all other independent 
and control variables were measured at time t. It should be noted that prior researchers have used 
                                                 
9 10% of equity ownership is generally required for an investor to have sufficient voting power 
and be able to exert control over the target firm (OECD, 2008). 
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a two-year (Westphal et al., 2001) and a four-year window (Haunschild, 1993) in 
operationalizing this variable. I chose to use a one-year window to avoid the potential influence 
of any organizational event or change that may transpire in the period leading up to the 
announcement of acquisition decisions and that may have a major influence on the 
organization’s decision to engage in acquisitions independent of its alters’ acquisition activity. 
Independent (moderator) variables. The independent variables include alters’ prior 
acquisition experience, betweenness centrality score of interlocking directors on the focal 
organization’s board, betweenness centrality score of interlocking directors on alters’ boards, 
average tie strength on the focal organization’s board, and average tie strength on alters’ 
boards. Alters’ acquisition experience is the total number of acquisitions announced by 
interlocked partners at time t. For firms that have more than one interlocking directorate tie, I 
used the average number of all acquisitions that were announced by the alters at time t. 
I computed the intraboard network measures in two steps. First, I infer the strength of 
intraorganizational network ties of boards of directors for each organization and each director 
dyad in each year by constructing a composite variable, which involves summing the 
standardized scores (Bellieveau, O’Reilly, & Wade, 1996) of a set of formative indicators of the 
second-order constructs of social influence, similarity, exchange, and history — network 
formation processes that I have identified based on prior research on social networks (Liben-
Nowell & Kleinberg, 2007; McPherson et al., 2001; Monge & Contractor, 2001, Rivera et al., 
2010), a behavioral theory of corporate governance (Westphal & Zajac, 2013), and recent 
theoretical work in corporate governance research (Shropshire, 2010). A detailed outline of this 
measurement model, which was originally developed for a different study, can be found in 
Appendices A and B. Second, I compute average tie strength by taking the mean of all dyadic 
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ties in a given board at a given time period. In the case when an organization is tied to more than 
one alter organization in a given year, I take the mean tie-strength score of alters’ boards. I 
compute other network-based measures, including directors’ betweenness centrality and the 
network-based control variables using igraph (Csardi & Nepusz, 2006) and SNA (Butts, 2007a; 
2007b) packages in R, using a dichotomized (based on mean tie strength of the sample) director-
to-director edge list. Centrality scores were calculated based on Freeman’s (1978) formulations. 
Betweenness centrality is measured as the number of times a given node (director) falls on the 
shortest path between other actors in the network. Interaction terms were created by mean 
centering the criterion variables and then multiplying them. Plots of the interaction effects 
reported in Figure 2 and 3 were generated by using the standardized scores for all control and 
independent variables (Dawson, 2014). 
Control variables. In the analysis, I controlled for three major dimensions of 
environmental uncertainty: dynamism, complexity, and hostility (or absence of munificence) 
(Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Miller & Friesen, 1983). Environmental dynamism 
and hostility were operationalized using a regression technique wherein 5-year log-transformed 
total industry sales [ln(sales + 1)] for a given 3-digit SIC industry category were regressed on 
time. The inverse of the regression coefficient is the degree of environmental hostility in the 
subsequent year, whereas the standard error of the regression is the degree of environmental 
dynamism in the subsequent year. Complexity was measured using the Herfindahl index, which 
is the sum of squared market shares of industry firms (Boyd, 1990; 1995), using non-transformed 
segment sales classified at the 3-digit SIC level. Industries that are more concentrated (few firms 
holding a large share of the market) are regarded as less complex. This variable is inversely 
coded, so that higher values denote increased levels of complexity. All segment related 
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information used in the construction of these variables was retrieved from CRSP Historical 
Segments database. Non-business segments were excluded from the computation. Organizational 
mimicry may be a result of strong coercive and/or normative pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). The mimetic processes may work at differential rates for different organizations based on 
the environmental dynamics that strategic leaders face and/or managerial discretion that they 
possess. Controlling for dimensions of environmental uncertainty helps tease out these effects to 
some extent. 
 In addition, I control for firm size by including the natural logarithm of an organization’s 
total assets, and prior performance, computed as log-transformed Tobin’s Q and return on 
investment (ROI). Both large organizations and high-performing organizations are more likely to 
possess slack resources than their smaller, poor-performing counterparts, and to engage in 
acquisitions. In this regard, I also control for debt-to-equity ratio (c.f., Haunschild, 1993) and 
organizational efficiency, using the ratio of total sales to stockholder equity as well as the ratio of 
total sales to invested capital, to capture the financial ability of organizations to engage in 
acquisitions.10 Organizational efficiency measures were included in the analysis as poor 
efficiency indicators may prompt executives to avoid engagement in acquisitions to implement 
operational- and strategic-level changes that would help ‘re-orient’ the organization (Barker & 
Duhaime, 1997). 
To account for informational advantages that may lead to acquisition activity through 
interlocking directorates (Haunschild, 1993; Shropshire, 2010), I controlled for betweenness 
centrality of the organization in the interlocking directorate. This measure was calculated based 
                                                 
10 For more information on these ratios, see WRSD Industry Financial Ratio manual developed 
by WRDS Research Team (2016). 
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on a one-mode organization-to-organization projection of the two-mode organization-to-director 
network, using Freeman’s (1978) betweenness centrality measure. An organization-to-
organization adjacency matrix shows relationships between interlocked organizations with 0 
denoting no interlocking relationship. This adjacency matrix was created by multiplying the two-
mode organization-to-director matrix with its transpose. Using the igraph package on R (Csardi 
& Nepusz, 2006), I calculated betweenness centrality as the number of times a given 
organization appears on the shortest path between interlocked organizations (Freeman, 1978). 
To capture the effect of prior experience in organizational boundary expansion on 
subsequent acquisition activity, following Haunschild (1993) I measured a focal organization’s 
average number of acquisitions in the last three years. The decision to control for the past three-
year acquisition activity follows from the repetitive momentum hypothesis, which suggests that 
an organization’s prior strategic choices can strongly influence subsequent strategic choices as 
decision rules are developed into “routines and competencies” (Amburgey & Miner, 1992: 336), 
a point that was similarly raised by Haunschild (1993). However, I should note that the results of 
the hypotheses tests reported in the following section remained unchanged when I used prior 
acquisition experience calculated using acquisition activity in the previous five years. 
Boards’ involvement in strategy and capacity to engage in monitoring and resource 
provision activities (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Johnson et al., 1996) are controlled for by 
including a number of indicator variables. Prior research has provided evidence of a relationship 
of board size and diversity with strategic change (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994), 
therefore I controlled for board size and percentage of female directors on the board in the 
analysis of acquisition decisions. Boards with longer average overlap in directors’ tenures may 
be associated with enhanced corporate strategic activity, as directors with overlapping tenures 
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may be able to more speedily reach strategic consensus based on tried-and-true intraboard 
routines that they have developed over time (Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010). Research 
shows evidence for an effect of executives age on acquisition decisions (Yim, 2013). 
Accordingly, I controlled for average age of directors on the board. Finally, at the board level, to 
capture the potential influence of director independence on acquisition decisions, I included 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board in the analysis as a proxy for board control.  
In addition, I compute structural equivalence and centralization on boards of directors using 
igraph (Csardi & Nepusz, 2006) and SNA (Butts, 2007a; 2007b) packages on R. Structural 
equivalence on the board denotes network homogeneity in terms of the distribution of ties within 
boards of directors. High levels of structural equivalence suggest that ties are relatively 
homogenously distributed among actors. It was calculated based on the Euclidean distance 
between dyads of directors’ ties to alters (Burt, 1976). Similarly, centralization (i.e., degree and 
betweenness centralization) measures the extent to which some directors on the board are more 
connected than others (Freeman, 1978). Both measures help capture potential consolidation of 
power and control within boards of directors, which could be consequential for acquisition 
decisions. To mirror these potential network effects in the context of alters’ boards, I 
incorporated average structural equivalence and centralization scores of alters’ in the analysis. 
Joseph, Ocasio, and McDonnell (2014) have shown that CEO power is an important 
determinant of a firm’s adoption of CEO-only governance structure. In line with this, I controlled 
for CEO power in the statistical model by adding CEO duality (i.e., CEO also serving as 
chairman of the organization). I captured the influence of CEOs’ characteristics and motivation 
to engage in acquisition strategies by incorporating CEO age, gender, and pay (log-transformed 
tdc1) as control variables. Prior research suggests that there is a relationship between CEO age 
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and risk taking, with older executives taking less risk than their younger counterparts (Serfling, 
2014). In addition, the literature shows evidence of an effect of CEO gender on acquisition 
decisions, with male executives being associated with more acquisition activity than their female 
counterparts (Huang & Kisgen, 2013). Finally, CEO pay has long been associated with risk-
taking preferences and behaviors of CEOs in corporate governance research (Coles, Daniel, & 
Naveen, 2006), therefore, it was included in the analysis of acquisition activity. 
To capture the potential influence of alters’ characteristics on the mimetic processes, I 
controlled for organizational size of alters by averaging log-transformed total assets of alters. 
Finally, I controlled for the average degree centrality (i.e., number of interlocking directorates) 
of alters’ to account for potential informational benefits that may accrue to a focal organization 
that is tied to heavily connected alters’ in the interlocking directorate network (Freeman, 1978).  
Analysis 
Given the nature of the dependent variable—a count variable—I used a panel conditional 
fixed effects negative binomial regression with year effects to test my hypotheses. A Hausman 
model specification test (Hausman, 1978) suggested that a fixed effects model was appropriate 
for the data. The results of the regression analysis are reported in Models 1 through 9 in Table 2, 
and the summary statistics for the regression analyses (e.g., log-likelihood ratios) are reported in 
Table 3. 
In Model 1, I regress control variables on total acquisition activity. In Model 2, I regress 
alters’ prior acquisition activity on the dependent variable. While I did not formally hypothesize 
a relationship, I expect alters’ prior acquisition activity to be positively related to organizations’ 
subsequent acquisition activity, consistent with prior research (Haunschild, 1993; Westphal et 
al., 2001). In Model 3, I regress all four criterion variables—betweenness centrality score of 
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interlocking directors on the focal organization’s board (sender’s betweenness from here on), 
betweenness centrality score of interlocking directors on alters’ boards (receiver’s betweenness 
from here on), average tie strength on the focal organization’s board (sender’s tie strength from 
here on), and average tie strength on alters’ boards (receiver’s tie strength from here on) —on 
total acquisition activity.  
Model 4 reports the interaction effects of sender’s betweenness centrality and alters’ prior 
acquisition experience, while Model 5 reports the interaction effect of receiver’s betweenness 
centrality and alters’ prior acquisition experience on total acquisition activity. Models 6 and 7 
report the interaction effects of alters’ prior acquisition experience with sender’s tie strength and 
receiver’s tie strength, respectively on total acquisition activity. In Model 8, I report the three-
way interaction effect of sender’s betweenness centrality, receiver’s betweenness centrality, and 
alters’ prior acquisition experience on total acquisition activity. Finally, the effect of the three-
way interaction among sender’s tie strength, receiver’s tie strength, and alters’ prior acquisition 
experience on total acquisition activity is reported in Model 9. 
F. Results 
Correlations and descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. As the results show, none 
of the correlations is above |.70|. In addition, the highest VIF statistic for any given variable in 
any model and the highest average VIF statistic for any given model shown in Table 2 was 1.97 
and 4.25, respectively, which are significantly below the commonly accepted level of 10. Overall 
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that multicollinearity is not an issue.  
In Model 1, of the control variables, organizational size, Tobin’s q, debt-to-equity ratio, 
betweenness centrality, and CEO total pay are positively related to focal organization’s total 
number of acquisition at time t+1. Overall, the results show that central, large, high-debt 
 137 
(relative to equity), or high performing organizations’ CEOs and CEOs who are paid relatively 
high engage in a greater number of acquisitions. 
In Model 2, I test the interorganizational imitation hypothesis that alters’ prior acquisition 
experience influences focal organizations’ subsequent acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993; Westphal 
et al., 2001). The average number of acquisitions announced by alters’ does not have a 
significant effect on focal organizations’ acquisition activity. This finding is not surprising given 
that not all interlocking directorates are uniformly formed to carry out economic objectives of 
organizations or to enact organizational environments (Mizruchi, 1996). It also gives credibility 
to the idea that some interlocks may transfer knowledge more successfully than others 
(Shropshire, 2010), an idea that I explore in Models 3 through 9. 
In Model 3, the results show that receiver’s betweenness centrality has a positive impact 
on the total number of acquisitions, while strength of ties in the focal organization’s board has a 
negative impact on acquisition activity. Whereas the former result is expected, the latter is 
somewhat surprising. A potential explanation is that decision making may be slowed down in 
boards of directors that are characterized by strong interpersonal linkages among their members. 
Consensus seeking among strongly connected alters may slow down pre-acquisition decision 
making processes (e.g., search, due diligence, etc.); as such, relational embeddedness within 
boards of directors may reduce overall acquisition activity. Nevertheless, this remains a 
plausible, but speculative, interpretation of the results, requiring further examination in future 
research. 
Hypothesis 1 was supported, as shown in Table 2, Model 4. The coefficient on the 
interaction term of alters’ prior acquisition experience and senders’ betweenness centrality is 
positive and significant (p < .05). As Figure 2 shows, consistent with Hypothesis 1, the influence 
 138 
of alters’ prior acquisition on focal organizations’ acquisition activity becomes stronger at higher 
levels of sender’s betweenness centrality. This suggests that access to and control over board 
processes at the focal organization’s board is an important determinant of interlocking directors’ 
capacity to transfer knowledge among tied organizations and implement it on the focal board. 
Hypothesis 2 suggested that centrality of directors in alters’ board positively moderates 
the effect of alters’ prior experience on focal organization’s acquisition activity. The results 
reported in Model 5 provide support for this hypothesis: the interaction term is positive and 
significant (p < .05). In Figure 3, the interaction plot shows that the influence of alters’ prior 
acquisitions on focal organization’s acquisition activity is enhanced when interlocked directors’ 
betweenness centrality is high. Put differently, the results corroborate the idea that access and 
control benefits that centrally connected directors enjoy on alters’ boards of directors enable 
them to acquire knowledge on alters’ acquisition strategies and use that information more 
influentially on the focal organization’s board. 
As Models 5 through 9 show, I did not find support for hypotheses 3, 4, 5, or 6. The 
results indicate that the position of interlocked directors in the social structure of boards of both 
the focal organization and its alters is a more important determinant of the extent to which 
interorganizational imitation occurs as compared to the relational characteristics of boards of 
directors (i.e., strength of ties). While tie strength has a direct negative effect on acquisition 
activity it does not interact with prior acquisition experience of alters. 
G. Discussion 
Interorganizational contagion and diffusion literatures have provided important evidence 
that interlocking directorates are networks that provide social capital benefits to organizations. 
One of the key social capital benefits that accrue to organizations that are embedded in these 
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networks is the facilitation of vicarious organizational learning and transfers of organizational 
knowledge (Tuschke et al., 2014). Organizational leaders become exposed to strategic decision-
making processes of other organizations in their networks when they forge interlocking 
directorate ties. Recent research on interlocks argues that not all interlocking directorates are 
conducive to organizational contagion and diffusion (e.g., Connelly et al., 2011; Sanders & 
Tuschke, 2007; Shipilov, Greve, Rowley, 2010; Shropshire, 2010; Tuschke et al., 2014). 
In the present study, I explored this idea further by examining the circumstances under 
which knowledge obtained via interlocks matter. I constructed a comprehensive sample, 
comprising 3,372 organization-year observations concerning acquisition activities of S&P 500 
organizations in the period between 2004 and 2015. The results provided strong support for 
Hypotheses 1 and 2—that central directors’ experiences matter. I did not find evidence to 
support Hypothesis 3 through 6. The results of the study suggest that interlocking directors’ 
access to and control over flow of knowledge-based resources on the focal and alter 
organizations’ boards of directors have a significant influence on the extent to which 
organizational imitation occurs. As hypothesized, I found that interlocks transfer knowledge 
more successfully to the extent that directors are positioned to have access to and control over 
key board processes. These findings contribute to research on corporate elite networks by 
simultaneously exploring the influence of external and internal networks of corporate elite 
members on organizational outcomes, providing credence to past theoretical research that has 
conceptualized directors’ access to board processes as a determinant of interorganizational 
diffusion in the context of interlocking directorates (e.g., Shropshire, 2010). 
The lack of significant findings for Hypothesis 4, 5, and 6 suggest that tie strength is not 
an important determinant of interorganizational imitation. Nevertheless, as Model 1 has shown, 
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tie strength within a focal organization’s board has a significant negative effect on total 
acquisition activity. This result, when combined with the findings pertaining to Hypotheses 1 and 
2, is certainly promising for future research efforts that may be directed towards better 
understanding how relational and structural embeddedness in boards of directors influence 
organizational strategy and policy decisions. In analyses that have been reported elsewhere, I 
found significant negative effect of cohesion among directors of a focal organization on 
organizational risk taking. The results suggested that cohesive board networks may engender 
potential agency costs. Future empirical research may separately investigate whether tie strength 
(including other operationalizations of relational and structural embeddedness) interact with prior 
acquisition experience of alters’ to predict level of activity for acquisitions that enhance 
organizational competitive advantage or that destroy stakeholder value. 
Another potential future direction involves distinguishing between formal task networks 
of boards of directors and informal social networks of directors within boards. While the former 
is cognitive in nature, the latter is affect-infused (see Fombrun, 1982; Ibarra, 1993; Umphress, 
Labianca, Brass, Kass, & Scholten, 2003 for discussions of instrumental and expressive ties), and 
therefore may have potentially different effects on acquisition activity. It would be interesting for 
future research to test the independent and interactive effects of interlocking directors’ 
prominence in task-based and affect-based social networks of boards of directors. For instance, a 
director who is central in the formal task network may be well-positioned to extract knowledge 
from alters, yet the capacity of the director to influence board processes (e.g., strategic decision-
making and policy-making) may be weakened to the extent that the director is at the periphery of 
the informal (e.g., friendship) network of boards of directors. 
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H. Conclusion 
In the present study, I found positive interaction effects of director centrality within 
boards of directors and alters’ prior acquisition experience on firm acquisition activity in the 
context of board interlocks. The study represents an important step towards better understanding 
how networks (ties within boards of directors) layered within other networks (ties between 
boards of directors) simultaneously influence interorganizational imitation of strategic decisions. 
The antecedents and consequences of directors’ embeddedness within the confines of corporate 
elite circles remains a relevant and important area of inquiry with underexplored territory, 
wherein novel research questions can be asked and examined. It is my hope that this study 
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J. Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
# Variables Mean St. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Total Acquisitions 1.26 2.17 - 
        
2 Dynamism 0.05 0.06 -0.05 - 
       
3 Complexity 0.82 0.21 0.03 -0.50 - 
      
4 Hostility -3.11 0.16 -0.06 0.50 -0.35 - 
     
5 Organizational Size log 9.73 1.45 0.05 0.26 -0.22 0.18 - 
    
6 Tobin's Q log 0.57 0.45 0.15 -0.23 0.21 -0.15 -0.51 - 
   
7 ROI 0.11 0.16 0.08 -0.06 0.05 -0.08 -0.09 0.33 - 
  
8 Debt to Equity Ratio 7250.06 25236.47 0.04 0.26 -0.24 0.19 0.54 -0.26 -0.11 - 
 
9 Efficiency_e 2.53 26.90 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 - 
10 Efficiency_i 1.54 1.84 0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.12 0.13 0.31 -0.12 0.14 
11 Org. Int. Betw Cent 700.41 806.00 0.10 0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.39 -0.09 0.04 0.21 0.01 
12 Org. Acquisition Experience 1.22 1.76 0.59 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.00 
13 Board Size 10.99 2.32 0.00 0.17 -0.22 0.13 0.50 -0.27 -0.02 0.24 0.03 
14 Degree Centralization 0.39 0.15 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 
15 Betweenness Centralization 0.23 0.16 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.26 0.14 0.01 -0.10 0.01 
16 Equivalence 1.66 0.54 0.00 -0.06 0.12 -0.10 -0.25 0.16 0.03 -0.16 -0.06 
17 Avg. # Independents 0.87 0.06 -0.04 0.10 -0.14 0.06 0.24 -0.12 0.01 0.07 0.01 
18 Avg. # Females 0.17 0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.11 0.08 0.21 -0.03 0.05 0.07 0.03 
19 Avg. Age of Directors 61.50 3.07 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.19 -0.17 -0.02 0.07 0.01 
20 Dir. Tenure Overlap 0.59 0.12 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.05 
21 CEO Total Pay log 8.98 1.14 0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.28 -0.10 0.00 0.08 0.03 
22 CEO Duality 0.61 0.49 0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.07 0.14 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 
23 CEO Age 55.89 5.83 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.16 -0.13 -0.01 0.04 0.00 
24 CEO Gender 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
25 Alters’ Avg. Size log 9.92 1.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 -0.07 0.04 0.15 0.01 
26 Alters’ Avg. Degree Centralization 0.39 0.09 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.00 
27 Alters’ Avg. Equivalence 1.61 0.32 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
28 Alters’ Avg. Acquisition Experience 6.72 8.07 0.12 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.02 
29 Sender Betweenness 10.15 9.67 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
30 Receiver Betweenness 9.19 7.81 0.00 0.07 -0.05 0.03 0.11 -0.07 -0.02 0.18 0.01 
31 Organization’s Strength of Ties 0.24 2.23 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.24 -0.07 0.03 0.07 -0.02 
32 Alters’ Avg. Strength of Ties 0.63 1.43 0.09 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.23 -0.06 0.02 0.17 0.01 






Table 1 (Cont.) 
# Variables 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11 Org. Int. Betw Cent 0.05 - 
         
12 Org. Acquisition Experience -0.01 0.11 - 
        
13 Board Size -0.04 0.37 0.01 - 
       
14 Degree Centralization 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.06 - 
      
15 Betweenness Centralization 0.04 -0.31 -0.02 -0.21 0.61 - 
     
16 Equivalence -0.02 -0.18 -0.03 -0.61 -0.36 -0.09 - 
    
17 Avg. # Independents 0.02 0.19 -0.02 0.17 0.01 -0.11 -0.07 - 
   
18 Avg. # Females 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.00 -0.12 0.13 - 
  
19 Avg. Age of Directors -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.14 -0.04 -0.09 -0.10 0.11 -0.05 - 
 
20 Dir. Tenure Overlap -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.28 -0.29 0.42 0.06 -0.01 0.06 - 
21 CEO Total Pay log 0.02 0.21 0.04 0.25 -0.02 -0.14 -0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.03 
22 CEO Duality 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.07 -0.01 -0.10 -0.01 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.06 
23 CEO Age 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.17 -0.06 -0.14 -0.09 0.05 0.02 0.35 0.03 
24 CEO Gender 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.07 0.24 -0.05 0.02 
25 Alters’ Avg. Size log 0.03 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.10 -0.11 -0.12 0.13 0.16 0.20 -0.03 
26 Alters’ Avg. Degree Centralization -0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00 
27 Alters’ Avg. Equivalence -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 -0.07 0.00 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.02 
28 Alters’ Avg. Acquisition Experience 0.03 0.55 0.14 0.28 0.00 -0.25 -0.12 0.10 0.16 -0.02 -0.05 
29 Sender Betweenness 0.02 -0.11 -0.03 0.29 0.36 0.48 -0.34 -0.01 0.08 0.03 -0.21 
30 Receiver Betweenness -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.03 
31 Organization’s Strength of Ties -0.03 0.35 0.01 0.07 -0.28 -0.60 0.43 0.15 -0.01 0.09 0.45 
32 Alters’ Avg. Strength of Ties 0.02 0.20 0.10 0.16 -0.01 -0.16 -0.06 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.01 
Note: Correlations and descriptive statistics were calculated based on 3372 firm-year observations. 











Table 1 (Cont.) 
# Variables 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
21 CEO Total Pay - 
          
22 CEO Duality 0.13 - 
         
23 CEO Age 0.09 0.20 - 
        
24 CEO Gender 0.05 0.01 -0.05 - 
       
25 Alters’ Avg. Size log 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.06 - 
      
26 Alters’ Avg. Degree Centralization 0.00 -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.07 - 
     
27 Alters’ Avg. Equivalence -0.05 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.29 -0.34 - 
    
28 Alters’ Avg. Acquisition Experience 0.17 0.12 0.06 0.01 0.28 -0.05 -0.06 - 
   
29 Sender Betweenness 0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.08 -0.05 -0.08 - 
  
30 Receiver Betweenness 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.10 0.17 -0.26 0.02 0.17 - 
 
31 Organization’s Strength of Ties 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.23 -0.03 -0.03 0.35 -0.38 0.04 - 
32 Alters’ Avg. Strength of Ties 0.06 0.10 0.05 -0.01 0.31 -0.31 0.42 0.27 0.00 -0.24 0.25 
Note: Correlations and descriptive statistics were calculated based on 3372 firm-year observations. 











Table 2: Conditional Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression 
DV: Total Acquisitions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef Std Er Sig Coef Std Er Sig Coef Std Er Sig 
Constant -2.99 1.30 * -2.98 1.31 * -3.73 1.36 ** 
Dynamism -0.17 0.58  -0.17 0.58  -0.25 0.59  
Complexity 0.33 0.27  0.33 0.27  0.34 0.27  
Hostility -0.29 0.19  -0.29 0.19  -0.29 0.19  
Org. Size log 0.14 0.06 * 0.14 0.06 * 0.15 0.06 * 
Tobin's Q log 0.37 0.11 ** 0.37 0.11 ** 0.39 0.11 ** 
ROI 0.12 0.16  0.12 0.16  0.13 0.16  
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 
Efficiency_e 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Efficiency_i -0.01 0.03  -0.01 0.03  0.00 0.03  
Org. Int. Betw. Cent 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 
Org. Acq. Experience -0.02 0.02  -0.02 0.02  -0.02 0.02  
Board Size 0.01 0.02  0.01 0.02  0.03 0.02  
Degree Centralization -0.08 0.23  -0.08 0.23  0.01 0.24  
Betweenness Centralization 0.08 0.22  0.08 0.22  -0.11 0.27  
Equivalence -0.04 0.09  -0.04 0.09  0.10 0.11  
Avg. # Independents -0.15 0.53  -0.15 0.53  -0.05 0.53  
Avg. # Females -0.22 0.44  -0.22 0.44  -0.25 0.44  
Avg. Age of Directors 0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  
Dir. Tenure Overlap 0.35 0.25  0.35 0.25  0.54 0.26 
* 
CEO Total Pay log 0.09 0.02 ** 0.09 0.02 ** 0.09 0.02 ** 
CEO Duality 0.03 0.07  0.03 0.07  0.03 0.07  
CEO Age 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.01  0.00 0.01  
CEO Gender 0.11 0.16  0.12 0.16  0.12 0.16  
Alters’ Avg. Size log -0.03 0.04  -0.03 0.04  -0.04 0.05  
Alters’ Avg. Degree Cent. -0.02 0.30  -0.02 0.30  0.08 0.30  
Alters’ Avg. Equivalence -0.07 0.09  -0.07 0.09  -0.13 0.11  
Alters’ Avg. Acquisition Exp. 
   
0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Sender Betweenness 
      
0.00 0.00  
Receiver Betweenness 
      
0.01 0.00 * 
Org.’s Strength of Ties 
      
-0.07 0.03 ** 
Alters’ Avg. Strength of Ties 
      
0.04 0.03  
Int. Term 1: Exp * Send. Cent. 
         
Int. Term 2: Exp * Rec. Cent. 
         
Int. Term 3: Exp * Send. Tie St. 
         
Int. Term 4: Exp * Rec. Tie St. 
         
Int. Term 5: Betweenness 
         
Int. Term 6: Tie Strength 
         
Int. Term 7: Three-way Betw. 
         
Int. Term 8: Three-way Tie St. 
         
† p < .10; * p < .05; p < 0.01 





Table 2 (Cont.) 
DV: Total Acquisitions Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variable Coef Std Er Sig Coef Std Er Sig Coef Std Er Sig 
Constant -3.69 1.36 ** -3.92 1.36 ** -3.73 1.36 ** 















 Org. Size log 0.15 0.07 * 0.16 0.07 * 0.15 0.06 * 
Tobin's Q log 0.39 0.11 ** 0.40 0.11 ** 0.39 0.11 ** 





 Debt to Equity Ratio 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 










 Org. Int. Betw. Cent 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 








































 Dir. Tenure Overlap 0.55 0.26 * 0.53 0.26 * 0.55 0.26 * 
CEO Total Pay log  0.09 0.02 ** 0.09 0.02 ** 0.09 0.02 ** 








































 Receiver Betweenness 0.01 0.00 * 0.01 0.00 ** 0.01 0.00 * 
Org.’s Strength of Ties -0.07 0.03 ** -0.08 0.03 ** -0.07 0.03 ** 





 Int. Term 1: Exp * Send. Cent. 0.00 0.00 * 
      Int. Term 2: Exp * Rec. Cent. 
 
0.00 0.00 * 
   Int. Term 3: Exp * Send. Tie St. 
    
0.00 0.00 
 Int. Term 4: Exp * Rec. Tie St. 
       Int. Term 5: Betweenness 
        Int. Term 6: Tie Strength 
        Int. Term 7: Three-way Betw. 
       Int. Term 8: Three-way Tie St. 
       † p < .10; * p < .05; p < 0.01 





Table 2 (Cont.) 
DV: Total Acquisitions Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Variable Coef Std Er Sig Coef Std Er Sig Coef Std Er Sig 
Constant -3.77 1.36 ** -3.79 1.36 ** -3.72 1.36 ** 
Dynamism -0.28 0.60  -0.31 0.59  -0.24 0.59  
Complexity 0.35 0.27  0.37 0.27  0.30 0.27  
Hostility -0.29 0.19  -0.29 0.19  -0.29 0.19  
Org. Size log 0.16 0.07 * 0.16 0.07 * 0.15 0.07 * 
Tobin's Q log 0.39 0.11 ** 0.39 0.11 ** 0.39 0.11 ** 
ROI 0.12 0.16  0.12 0.16  0.12 0.16  
Debt to Equity Ratio 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 
Efficiency_e 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Efficiency_i 0.00 0.03  0.00 0.03  0.00 0.03  
Org. Int. Betw Cent 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 ** 
Org. Acquisition Experience -0.02 0.02  -0.02 0.02  -0.02 0.02  
Board Size 0.03 0.02  0.02 0.02  0.03 0.02  
Degree Centralization -0.01 0.24  -0.07 0.24  0.07 0.24  
Betweenness Centralization -0.09 0.27  -0.07 0.27  -0.12 0.27  
Equivalence 0.10 0.11  0.08 0.11  0.09 0.11  
Avg. # Independents -0.08 0.53  -0.05 0.53  -0.05 0.53  
Avg. # Females -0.21 0.44  -0.29 0.44  -0.30 0.44  
Avg. Age of Directors 0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  0.02 0.01  
Dir. Tenure Overlap 0.52 0.26 * 0.51 0.26 † 0.60 0.26 * 
CEO Total Pay log 0.09 0.02 ** 0.10 0.02 ** 0.09 0.02 ** 
CEO Duality 0.02 0.07  0.03 0.07  0.02 0.07  
CEO Age 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.01  0.00 0.01  
CEO Gender 0.12 0.16  0.12 0.16  0.10 0.16  
Alters’ Avg. Size log -0.04 0.05  -0.04 0.05  -0.05 0.05  
Alters’ Avg. Degree Cent. 0.06 0.30  0.02 0.30  0.11 0.30  
Alters’ Avg. Equivalence -0.13 0.11  -0.11 0.11  -0.15 0.11  
Alters’ Avg. Acquisition Exp. 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Sender Betweenness 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  
Receiver Betweenness 0.01 0.00 * 0.01 0.00 * 0.01 0.00 * 
Org. Strength of Ties -0.07 0.03 ** -0.07 0.03 ** -0.08 0.03 ** 
Alters’ Avg. Strength of Ties 0.03 0.03  0.04 0.03  0.05 0.03 
† 
Int. Term 1: Exp * Send. Cent. 
   
0.00 0.00 † 
   
Int. Term 2: Exp * Rec. Cent. 
   
0.00 0.00 * 
   
Int. Term 3: Exp * Send. Tie St. 
      
0.00 0.00  
Int. Term 4: Exp * Rec. Tie St. 0.00 0.00     
-0.01 0.00 * 
Int. Term 5: Betweenness 
   
0.00 0.00 † 
   
Int. Term 6: Tie Strength 
      
0.03 0.01 ** 
Int. Term 7: Three-way Betw. 
   
0.00 0.00     
Int. Term 8: Three-way Tie St. 
      
0.00 0.00  
† p < .10; * p < .05; p < 0.01 
log = log-transformed 
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Table 3: Model Summaries 
Model # of Observations # of Firms Log Likelihood Wald 𝛘 2 AIC BIC Hypothesis Tested Supported 
Model 1 3375 367 -3454.83 129.43** 6983.65 7210.25 Control 
 
Model 2 3375 367 -3454.83 129.43** 6985.65 7218.37 Experience 
 
Model 3 3372 367 -3444.34 143.49** 6972.67 7229.85 Criterion Variables 
 
Model 4 3372 367 -3441.85 148.95** 6969.70 7233.00 H1 Yes 
Model 5 3372 367 -3441.44 149.84** 6968.87 7232.17 H2 Yes 
Model 6 3372 367 -3444.20 143.63** 6974.40 7237.70 H4 No 
Model 7 3372 367 -3443.37 145.79** 6972.74 7236.04 H5 No 
Model 8 3372 367 -3437.72 157.87** 6967.45 7249.12 H3 No 
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Figure 2: The Interaction Effect of Partner’s Prior Acquisition Experience and Interlocking Directors’ Average Betweenness 













Figure 3: The Interaction Effect of Partner’s Prior Acquisition Experience and Interlocking Directors’ Average Betweenness 











Appendix A: Constructing Intraorganizational Ties of Boards of Directors and Inferring Tie Strength from Objective 
Indicators 
 
Indicator Variable Social Similarity Social Influence Social Exchange Social History 
Co-Dependent 1    
Co-Independent 1    
Co-Gender 1    
Co-Oldsters 1    
Co-Youngsters 1    
Age Similarity 1    
Honorific Title 1    
Military Title 1    
Administrative Title 1    
Public Service Title 1    
Pro Directors 1    
Novice Directors 1    
Current Board Seats  1   
Firm Committee Seats  1   
Firm Committee Chairs  1   
Committee Chairs Local  1   
Committee Financial Expert Global  1   
Prestige  1   
Co-Financial Expert   1  
Co-Hierarchical Standing   1  
Related Interlocking Directorate   1  
Vertical Interlocking Directorate   1  
Overlap in Board Tenure    1 









Appendix B: Descriptions of Dyadic Variables used in the Construction of Tie Strength 
Indicator Variable Description 
Co-Dependent Both directors are non-independent directors 
Co-Independent Both directors are independent directors 
Co-Gender Both directors are female  
Co-Oldsters Both directors are within the 75th quartile of the sample in age 
Co-Youngsters Both directors are within the 25th quartile of the sample in age 
Age Similarity Absolute difference in directors age (reverse coded) 
Honorific Title Both directors hold honorific titles (e.g., Lord, Duke, Lady, etc.) 
Military Title Both directors hold military titles (e.g., Admiral, General, etc.) 
Administrative Title Both directors hold administrative titles (e.g., Senator, Governor, etc.) 
Public Service Title Both directors hold public servant titles (e.g., Doctor, Professor, Dean, etc.) 
Pro Directors Both directors are within the 75th quartile of the sample in tenure 
Novice Directors Both directors are within the 25th quartile of the sample in tenure 
Current Board Seats Absolute difference in the number of current boards seats held 
Firm Committee Seats Absolute difference in the number of committee seats held on the board 
Firm Committee Chairs Absolute difference in the number of committee chairmanships held on the board 
Committee Chairs Local Absolute difference in the number committee chairmanships held in S&P 500 firms 
Committee Financial Expert Global  Absolute difference in the number financial expert position held all BoardEx firms 
Prestige  Absolute difference in the maximum asset size of S&P 500 firms on which the directors serve 
Co-Financial Expert Both directors are financial experts on the board (assumed communication link) 
Co-Hierarchical Standing 
Both directors hold hierarchical title on the board (i.e., CEO, Chairman, Lead Independent Director, 
Committee Chair) (assumed communication link) 
Related Interlocking Directorate Other firms on which directors serve are matched at the 1-digit SIC level 
Vertical Interlocking Directorate 
Other firms on which directors serve are vertically related, that is their representative industries (based 
on 2-digit NAICS code) have a non-zero input-output. Bureau of Labor Statics’ interindustry sales 
table was used in the construction of this table. 
Overlap in Board Tenure 
Overlap in tenure of directors [1 – abs(tenure_dir_a – tenure_dir_b)/(tenure_dir_a + tenure_dir_b)]: 
missing values due to calculation error were replaced with 0. 









I began this dissertation with the motivation of helping the management field develop a 
more advanced understanding of how the social context within which directors are embedded 
influences organizational strategy decisions. I conducted a traditional narrative and a systematic 
main path analytic review of the literature, developing a new framework for organizing extant 
research on managerial networks and outlining key research themes. I found evidence that 
cohesive boards of directors may suffer from agency problems, whereas boards with structurally 
equivalent positions may be less susceptible to these problems. These findings suggest that 
whether directors’ embeddedness in intraorganizational board networks is beneficial or 
detrimental requires further research attention. I also found evidence that interorganizational 
imitation of corporate strategic activity is more likely to occur when interlocking directors are 
central actors in the intraboard networks of connected organizations. Taken together, the findings 
presented in this dissertation provide important evidence that directors’ social networks are 
consequential for organizational strategy and governance structures. Nevertheless, the notion that 
organizational economic conduct is embedded in and shaped by social relationships 
(Granovetter, 1985) should be further corroborated by future research. It is my hope that this 
dissertation advances that effort in the context of corporate board networks. 
